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IN MEMORIAM
On November 19, 
2020 , 52-yea r-o ld 
Ontar io Provincial 
Police (OPP) Constable 
Marc Hovingh was 
killed in a  shooting 
that also left a civilian dead in the tight-knit 
community of Manitoulin Island. Along 
with another member, Constable Hovingh 
attended a property after its owner reported 
the presence of an unwanted man. Soon 
after arriving, a man was located inside a 
trailer. There was an exchange of gunfire 
between Constable Hovingh and the man, 
resulting in both men being struck. They 
were transported to hospital where both 
succumbed to their injuries.
A well-respected officer, Constable 
Hovingh was also known as a devoted 
family man. He leaves behind his wife and 
four children. He was highly regarded in 
the community  where he coached minor 
hockey throughout his career and was 
active in the Mindemoya local Missionary 
Church where he was involved with the 
Sunday school program for the last 20 
years.
Constable Hovingh was talented in 
woodworking and carpentry. He built his 
family home and was planning to build 
“tiny” homes in his retirement. He was not 
only  handy on land, but also was an avid 
sailor and enjoyed taking people out on his 
boat. Constable Hovingh served with the 
OPP for 28 years.
~ Constable Marc Hovingh~
Source: https://www.opp.ca/news/#/viewnews/5fb72042036bd and https://www.siu.on.ca/en/news_template.php?nrid=6153.
"We are grateful and 
forever indebted to you for 
your service."
OPP Commissioner Thomas Carrique
November 28, 2020
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Law Enforcement Studies Diploma
Be the one making a difference  and keeping 
communities safe. If you want to gain the applied 
skills to be a sought-after graduate pursuing a 
rewarding career in law enforcement and public 
safety, then this program is for you.
Click Here
Law Enforcement Studies Degree
If you have a relevant diploma, and are interested in 
obtaining an applied degree to pursue a law 
enforcement or public  safety career, then this 
program is for you. This program builds on previous 
relevant studies with an applied degree, and is 
designed to increase your chances of success.
Click Here
Post-Baccalaureate Diploma in 
Disaster Management
Be the one in a dynamic and growing field keeping 
communities safe. If you have a bachelor's degree 
and are interested in pursuing and advancing your 
career in the fields of disaster and emergency 
management, this program is for you.
Click Here
Certificate in Emergency 
Management
Be the one advancing  your career. If you are 
interested in a career in emergency management, 
currently work as an emergency manager, or are a 
first responder or public safety  professional looking 
to move into an emergency management role, this 
program is for you.
Click Here
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN THE 
LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Academic literacy in the social sciences.
Judy Eaton & David N. Morris.
Toronto; Vancouver: Canadian Scholars, 2019.
H 62 E27 2019
All you have to do is ask: how to master the most 
important skill for success.
Wayne Baker.
New York, NY: Currency, 2020.
HD 30.3 B365 2020
American epidemic: reporting from the front 
lines of the opioid crisis.
edited by John McMillian; wtih a foreword by Leslie 
Jamison.
New York, NY: The New Press, 2019.
RC 568 O45 A435 2019
The blindspots between us: how to overcome 
unconscious cognitive bias and build better 
relationships.
Gleb Tsipursky, PhD.
Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications, Inc., 
2020.
BF 447 T78 2020
Crisis communication strategies: how to prepare 
in advance, respond effectively and recover in 
full.
Amanda Coleman.
London; New York, NY : Kogan Page, 2020.
HD 49.3 C65 2020
Ethics for the public service professional.
Aric W. Dutelle & Randy S. Taylor.
Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2018.
JL 111 E84 D88 2018
How we learn: why brains learn better than any 
machine ... for now.
Stanislas Dehaene.
New York, NY: Viking, 2020.
BF 318 D44 2020
Life's great question: discover how you contribute 
to the world.
Tom Rath.
San Francisco, CA: Silicon Guild Books, 2020.
BF 481 R38 2020
Optimal outcomes: free yourself from conflict at 
work, at home, and in life.
Jennifer Goldman-Wetzler, PhD.
New York, NY: Harper Business, an imprint of 
HarperCollinsPublishers, 2020.
HM 1126 G64 2020
Overdose: heartbreak  and hope in Canada's opioid 
crisis.
Benjamin Perrin.
Toronto, ON: Viking, an imprint of Penguin Canada, 
a division of Penguin Random House Canada 
Limited, 2020.
RC 568 O45 P47 2020
Resilience at work: practical tools for career 
success .
Kathryn Jackson.
Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2019.
BF 698.35 R47 J33 2019
The resi l ient practit ioner: burnout and 
compassion fatigue prevention and self-care 
strategies for the helping professions.
Thomas M. Skovholt & Michelle Trotter-Mathison.
London; New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2016.
RC 451.4 M44 S57 2016
What's your problem?: to solve your toughest 
problems, change the problems you solve.
Thomas Wedell-Wedellsborg.
Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2020.
HD 30.29 W434 2020
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ALBERTA JORDAN 
APPLICATIONS
In 2016, the Supreme Court of Canada established 
a new framework for applying s. 11(b) of the 
Charter - the right to be tried within a reasonable 
time - R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27. A majority of the 
Supreme Court created a presumptive  ceiling on 
the time it should take to bring an accused person 
to trial: 
• 18  months for cases going to trial in the 
provincial court; and 
• 30  months for cases going to trial in the 
superior court. 
In October 2016, Alberta’s Justice and Solicitor 
General started tracking defence applications to 
dismiss cases based on the Jordan timelines. 
Between October 25, 2016 and September 30, 
2020, there were 289 Jordan applications filed in 
Albert courts.
Of the  289 applications, they were 
disposed of in the following manner:
• 10 pending;
• 90 dismissed by the Court;
• 32 granted (one being a possible 
appeal by Crown);
• 52 abandoned by defence
• 41  proactively stayed by the Crown 
(on the basis that they would not have 
survived a Jordan application); and
• 64 were resolved (unrelated to Jordan).
Charter of Rights
s. 11 Any person charged with 
an offence has the right: ... 
b. to be tried within a 
reasonable time; ... 
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LEGALLY SPEAKING:
“• Once the presumptive ceiling is exceeded, the burden 
shifts to the Crown to rebut the presumption of 
unreasonableness on the basis of exceptional circumstances. 
Exceptional circumstances lie outside the Crown’s control in that 
(1) they are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, 
and (2) they cannot reasonably be remedied. If the exceptional 
circumstance relates to a discrete event, the delay reasonably 
attributable to that event is subtracted. If the exceptional 
circumstance arises from the case’s complexity, the delay is 
reasonable.
• Below the presumptive ceiling, in clear cases, the defence 
may show that the delay is unreasonable. To do so, the defence 
must establish two things: (1) it took meaningful steps that 
demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings; and 
(2) the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.”
Justices Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 at para. 105. 
Dispositions of Alberta Jordan Applications
Source: Jordan Applications
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BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com
IT’S TIME TO SPEAK UP ABOUT MENTAL HEALTH.
SHARE IT. DON’T WEAR IT.
WORKSAFEBCVOLUNTEER 
FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION 
OF BC
BC MUNICIPAL 
CHIEFS 
OF POLICE
BC EMERGENCY 
HEALTH 
SERVICES
BRITISH COLUMBIA 
PROFESSIONAL 
FIRE FIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION
FIRE CHIEFS’ 
ASSOCIATION
 OF BC
CANADA 
BORDER 
SERVICES 
AGENCY
FIRST NATIONS 
EMERGENCY 
SERVICES 
SOCIETY OF 
BRITISH COLUMBIA
GREATER 
VANCOUVER 
FIRE CHIEFS
 ASSOCIATION
PROVINCE 
OF BC
TRANSIT 
POLICE
ROYAL 
CANADIAN 
MOUNTED 
POLICE
AMBULANCE 
PARAMEDICS 
OF BRITISH 
COLUMBIA
BRITISH
 COLUMBIA 
POLICE 
ASSOCIATION
www.BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com 
For more resources on better understanding mental health in the context of the 
experiences and pressures of first responders, as well as the broader population, 
visit the following link.
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COPS TOP COURTS IN 
CANADIAN CONFIDENCE
In a recent Statistics Canada report - “Public 
Perceptions of the Police in Canada’s Provinces, 
2019” - it was revealed that Canadians have far 
more confidence in the police than they do in the 
Canadian criminal courts. While 41%  of 
Canadians said they had a great deal of confidence 
in the police, only 14%  said they had a great deal 
of confidence in the criminal courts. 
The survey also reported how well Canadians felt 
the criminal courts were doing in specific 
performance measures. 
Confidence in Police
Overall, 90% of Canadians living in the provinces 
said they had confidence in the police. Only 7% 
said they did not have very much confidence  while 
2% reported having no confidence at all. Residents 
of PEI had the highest level of confidence in the 
police (97%) while Manitoba had the least (87%). 
Other highlights of the report include:
• Persons with a disability  were less likely than 
people without a disability to report a  great deal 
of confidence in the police. 
• Confidence in the police was highest among 
seniors. 
• Confidence in the police was lower among 
Indigenous people.
• Visible minorities reported less confidence in 
the police than non-visible minorities.
10%
17%
24%
31%
38%
45%
14%
41%
Police Criminal Courts
Great Deal of Confidence
Canadian Criminal Courts
Performance 
Measure
Good 
job
Average 
job
Poor 
job
Don’t 
know
Providing justice 
quickly
10% 30% 31% 28%
Helping victims 14% 32% 21% 33%
Determining guilt 19% 35% 12% 34%
Ensuring a fair trial 
for the accused
26% 32% 8% 33%
CONFIDENCE IN POLICE BY PROVINCE
Province Total Great deal Some
PEI 97% 59% 38%
NL 93% 49% 44%
QC 92% 43% 49%
NB 92% 45% 47%
SK 91% 46% 45%
AB 90% 41% 49%
NS 90% 41% 49%
BC 89% 39% 50%
ON 89% 40% 49%
MB 87% 34% 53%
Canada 90% 41% 49%
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Confidence by CMA
Confidence in the police was generally high among 
Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs). “A CMA is 
formed by one or more adjacent municipalities 
centred on a population centre (known as the 
core). A CMA must have a total population of at 
least 100,000, of which 50,000 or more must live in 
its core.” 
Police Performance
The report also examined the perception of police 
performance across six measures:
• Enforcing the laws;
• Promptly responding to calls;
• Being approachable and easy to talk to;
• Supplying information to the public on ways to 
prevent crime;
• Ensuring the safety of the citizens in the area; 
and
• Treating people fairly. 
CONFIDENCE IN POLICE BY CMA
CMA Some or a Great Deal of Confidence
Abbotsford-Mission, BC 98%
Trois-Rivières, QC 97%
Saguenay, QC 95%
Québec, QC 94%
Gatineau, QC 94%
London, ON 93%
Regina, SK 93%
Calgary, AB 93%
St. Catharines–Niagara, ON 92%
Kitchener–Cambridge–Waterloo, ON 92%
St. John’s, NL 91%
Moncton, NB 91%
Montréal, QC 91%
Hamilton, ON 91%
Windsor, ON 91%
Saskatoon, SK 91%
Halifax, NS 90%
Sherbrooke, QC 90%
Victoria, BC 90%
Ottawa, ON 89%
Toronto, ON 88%
Winnipeg, MB 88%
Edmonton, AB 88%
Kelowna, BC 87%
Vancouver, BC 87%
Greater Sudbury, ON 84%
All CMAs 90%
Police Performance Measures
Performance 
Measure
Good 
job
Average 
job
Poor 
job
Don’t 
know
Enforcing the laws 46% 33% 5% 15%
Promptly 
responding to 
calls
40% 26% 7% 27%
Being 
approachable and 
easy to talk to
49% 24% 6% 20%
Supplying 
information to the 
public on ways to 
prevent crime
37% 31% 10% 22%
Ensuring the 
safety of the 
citizens in the 
area
44% 33% 6% 17%
Treating people 
fairly
42% 26% 8% 24%
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REASONABLE GROUNDS 
VIEWED CUMULATIVELY, 
CONTEXTUALLY & 
COMMONSENSICALLY
R. v. Coutu, 2020 MBCA 106               
A convenience store  was robbed by 
a man armed with a machete. The 
robber took a small amount of 
money and fled on foot with an 
accomplice who was believed to be 
a female wearing a black jacket. The police arrived 
at the store within minutes of the  robbery. Officers 
obtained a description of the suspects from the 
store owners and hastily viewed a surveillance 
video. The man was described as about 30-years-
old; 5’ 10”; and medium build, with a lighter skin 
tone.  He was wearing  black Nike shoes with a 
white swoosh, dark clothing, and a black winter 
jacket with a  hood and a small logo over the left 
breast. His face was covered and he was wearing 
gloves, carrying a knife and had a laptop bag.
About 10 minutes after the robbery, police used a 
dog to track the suspects from the store. The dog 
led the officers to a discarded laptop bag, and then 
to a residence a further street away. Police arrived 
at the residence about 30 minutes after the robbery 
had occurred. The dog handler believed the 
suspects had entered the residence through a side 
door but, due to the passage of time, he could not 
say for certain if they were still inside. The police 
dog picked up a track leaving the rear door of the 
residence and a fresh bicycle track was seen in the 
snow leaving the front yard of the residence.
Police then saw two individuals come into the back 
yard of the residence after exiting a vehicle that had 
just pulled up in the back lane. One of these 
individuals was believed to be a female and was 
wearing a grey jacket while  the other was the 
accused. The accused had the same stature as the 
male robbery suspect and was wearing black Nike 
shoes with a white swoosh, dark clothing and a 
black winter jacket with a hood.  His face was 
difficult to see and he was carrying a backpack. An 
officer yelled, “Police, show me your hands.”  
The accused began to walk backwards and tried to 
“gingerly” remove his backpack.  The officer 
thought the accused was “potentially  going to start 
running away”. Based on the officer’s experience, 
this behaviour “heightened” a belief that the 
accused was the male suspect.  The officer then 
arrested the accused and the backpack was 
searched incidental to the arrest. In the backpack, 
police found a loaded sawed-off rifle, two throwing 
stars and an air pistol with a silencer. The other 
individual with the accused turned out to be a man, 
not a woman.  
Once the accused had been arrested, the police 
reviewed the video surveillance at the store. With 
the opportunity  and time now to scrutinize the 
“very  fine details” and subtleties of the surveillance 
video and carefully watch the robbery from 
multiple camera angles, the police  were able to 
quickly clear the accused of the robbery even 
though his appearance, clothing and footwear were 
similar to the male suspect’s. Nevertheless, the 
accused was charged with multiple firearms and 
weapons offences. 
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench (?)
The judge found the accused’s arrest 
unlawful. In his view, the arresting 
officer’s grounds were “far short of being 
objectively reasonable.”  The description 
of the male suspect and the accused did not exactly 
“match.” As well, the stature  of the accused and 
the male suspect was “common” and the person 
with the accused was a male  wearing a grey jacket 
as opposed to a female wearing a  black jacket.  In 
the judge’s opinion, the officer, “at best”, had a 
reasonable suspicion that could have allowed for 
an investigative detention.
Since the accused’s arrest was illegal, the 
warrant less search of his backpack was 
unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter. However, 
the judge nevertheless admitted the evidence under 
s. 24(2) because excluding it would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The 
accused was convicted of possessing a  loaded 
prohibited  firearm, carrying a concealed weapon 
(the air pistol with a silencer), possessing a 
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prohibited weapon (the throwing stars) and five 
counts of possessing weapons contrary to a 
prohibition order. He was sentenced to five and 
half years in prison less six months for the 
deliberate  disregard shown by the  police  when they 
breached his Charter rights. The sentence was 
further reduced by 1.5 months for pre-trial custody.
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The Crown argued, among other 
things, that the trial judge erred 
in finding the accused’s arrest 
unlawful. Thus, his sentence 
should not have been reduced because of the state 
misconduct (Charter breaches).
Legality of an Arrest
A warrantless arrest under s. 495(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Code requires the arresting officer 
subjectively believe they have reasonable grounds 
on which to base the arrest and those grounds must 
be objectively justifiable to a reasonable person 
placed in the position of the  officer. In discussing 
reasonable grounds for arrest, Justice Mainella, for 
the unanimous Court of Appeal, noted the 
following:
• “In assessing the totality of the circumstances 
of an arrest, it is important to bear in mind 
‘that the police are often required to make 
split-second decisions in fluid and potentially 
dangerous situations’ based on the available 
information which may be imperfect, evolving 
or even turn out to be wrong.”
• “The point at which credibly-based probability 
replaces suspicion is often unclear and 
debatable.  While police officers must evaluate 
discrepancies and uncertainties in information 
before  acting upon it, the mere existence  of 
discrepancies or uncertainties is not fatal to 
there being reasonable  grounds to arrest. A 
belief can be objectively reasonable even if it 
turns out to be wrong.”
In this case, “there were language barriers with the 
store  owners, there was no time to do anything 
more than briefly  look at the surveillance video 
and the male suspect was armed.” In finding the 
trial judge erred in concluding that the arresting 
officer’s grounds to arrest were not objectively 
reasonable, the Court of Appeal concluded:
The judge misapplied the totality-of-the-
circumstances test by failing to consider all of 
the relevant circumstances known to the 
arresting officer.  When confronted by the 
police, the accused reacted in a way suggesting 
he was about to flee. The arresting officer relied 
on this fact in his decision-making, as he was 
entitled to do.  Flight or other suspicious 
behaviour is a factor a police officer can rely 
upon to support other grounds to arrest where 
the indicia of it occurs before the decision to 
arrest is made.
We are satisfied that the totality of the 
circumstances provided reasonable grounds to 
BY THE BOOK:
Criminal Code
Arrest without warrant
s. 495(1) A peace officer may arrest 
without warrant
(a) a person who has committed an indictable 
offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he 
believes has committed or is about to 
commit an indictable offence; ...
“In assessing the totality of the circumstances of an arrest, it is important to bear 
in mind ‘that the police are often required to make split-second decisions in fluid 
and potentially dangerous situations’ based on the available information which 
may be imperfect, evolving or even turn out to be wrong.”
Volume 20 Issue 6 ~ November/December 2020
PAGE 11
arrest the accused. The dog-track evidence put 
the accused in the pool of potential 
suspects.  While it is true that the accused’s 
stature was not suspicious, it did not exclude 
him from being the male suspect because the 
two were similar in height and build. The 
timing here was not too long to make the male 
suspect’s description stale, but long enough to 
allow him to have done more than simply run 
into the residence in question. The differences 
between the black-hooded winter jackets worn 
by the male suspect and the accused were 
trivial. Both the accused and the male suspect 
were wearing dark clothing.  Importantly, the 
accused’s footwear appeared, at a distance, 
identical to that described to be worn by the 
male suspect.  The arresting officer explained 
that his experience was that, while it is not 
uncommon for robbery suspects to change their 
clothing after a robbery to evade capture, they 
“don’t often change their footwear”. Finally, the 
accused’s suspicious behaviour when 
confronted by the police supported the other 
grounds.
The cumulative effect of these circumstances, 
viewed contextually, commonsensically, and in 
light of the arresting officer’s experience and 
training, established that the arresting officer 
objectively had reasonable grounds to arrest 
the accused. [references omitted, paras. 22-24]
Since the arrest was lawful, the search of the 
backpack incidental to the arrest was reasonable.
Sentence Reduction
Absent a Charter breach, it was an error for the trial 
judge to reduce the accused’s sentence for that 
reason. And there was no other state misconduct 
that would otherwise justify a sentence reduction. 
“While the police did make a mistaken identity, 
they treated the accused professionally, fairly and 
acted diligently to exclude him from the robbery,” 
said Justice Mainella.  “There was no misconduct 
relevant to the circumstances of the offence or the 
offender which could be used as a mitigating 
factor on sentence.”
The Court of Appeal did, however, find the 
accused’s sentence related to his breaching of the 
prohibition orders should have been consecutive to 
the possession of a loaded prohibited firearm 
conviction:
Prohibition orders are designed to protect the 
p u b l i c b y r e d u c i n g t h e m i s u s e o f 
weapons.  Parliament has recognised the 
severity of contravening a prohibition order by 
setting the maximum term of imprisonment at 
10 years.  Accordingly, there must be “serious 
consequences” for a person subject to a 
prohibition order who chooses to violate 
it.  Sentencing courts should not treat 
contravening a prohibition order in a manner 
like failing to attend court or to comply with a 
condition of judicial interim release or 
probation; it is not a run-of-the-mill breach 
offence. [references omitted, para. 34]
The accused’s sentence was varied. It was increased 
to a  total of six years’ imprisonment less pre-trial 
custody credit.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“The point at which credibly-based probability replaces suspicion is often unclear 
and debatable. While police officers must evaluate discrepancies and 
uncertainties in information before acting upon it, the mere existence of 
discrepancies or uncertainties is not fatal to there being reasonable grounds to 
arrest. A belief can be objectively reasonable even if it turns out to be wrong.”
“The cumulative effect of these 
circumstances, viewed contextually, 
commonsensically, and in light of the 
arresting officer’s experience and 
training, established that the arresting 
officer objectively had reasonable 
grounds to arrest the accused.”
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RCMP RELEASE EMPLOYEE 
DIVERSITY STATISTICS
The RCMP has released statistics 
s h o w i n g t h e c u r r e n t 
representation rates for all 
categories of employees as 
at April 1, 2020. The 
percentage of women 
c o m p r i s i n g r e g u l a r 
members has remained 
stable over the last five 
years, from a low of 21.6% in 2016, 2017, 
and 2018 to a high of 21.8%  in 2019. More 
than half of the civilian members and more 
than three-quarters of its public service 
employees were women.
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
75.9%77.4%78.1%
79.4%79.6%
50.9%51.1%51.7%52%52%
21.7%21.8%21.6%21.6%21.6%
Regular Members Civilian Members Public Service Employees
Women in the RCMP 
Women in the Ranks (%)
Special Constable 5.2% Superintendent 25.4%
Constable 23.1% Chief Superintendent 22.8%
Corporal 21.1% Assistant Commissioner 26.9%
Sergeant 19.2% Deputy Commissioner 16.7%
Staff Sergeant 11.0% Commissioner 100%
Inspector 24.3% All Ranks 21.8%
Source:https://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/transparenc/police-info-policieres/employ/2020-eng.htm
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The RCMP also surveyed their workforce to 
determine the number of individuals who self-
identified as a member of a  visible minority, 
Indigenous peoples, and persons with a disability. 
Employees could choose to identify with more than 
one group or not to identify at all.  
Indigenous Peoples (as a percentage)
Visible Minorities (as a percentage)
Regular Members with Disabilities
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
0% 5% 10%
5.5%
5.6%
5.9%
6%
6.1%
3.6%
3.7%
3.9%
3.9%
3.7%
7.2%
7.5%
7.8%
8%
8.1%
Regular Members
Civilian Members
Public Service Employees
Indigenous Peoples in the Ranks (%)
Special Constable 9.5% Superintendent 7.4%
Constable 6.3% Chief Superintendent 3.5%
Corporal 8.7% Assistant Commissioner 3.8%
Sergeant 8.9% Deputy Commissioner 0%
Staff Sergeant 9.7% Commissioner 0%
Inspector 9.5% All Ranks 7.2%
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
0% 7.5% 15%
14.4%
13.9%
13.9%
13.4%
13.2%
14.5%
14%
13.6%
13.1%
12.4%
11.9%
11.5%
11.1%
10.5%
10.1%
Regular Members
Civilian Members
Public Service Employees
Visible Minorities in the Ranks (%)
Special Constable 1.7% Superintendent 12.7%
Constable 12.5% Chief Superintendent 7.0%
Corporal 10.3% Assistant Commissioner 3.8%
Sergeant 11.4% Deputy Commissioner 0%
Staff Sergeant 11.0% Commissioner 0%
Inspector 17.5% All Ranks 11.9%
0%
1%
2%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
1.4%1.6%
1.7%1.9%
2.0%
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YK
131
BC
9,290
NU
135
NWT
194
AB
7,687
SK
2,380
MB
2,621
ON
25,340
QC
15,622
NL
902
PEI
215
NS
1,852
NB
1,251In 2018/19 the total expenditure on policing was
$15,670,293,000
RCMP Operation & 
Corporate ‘HQ’  849
CANADA: By the Numbers
Royal Newfoundland Constabulary
 400
Quebec Provincial Police
5,433
Ontario Provincial Police
 5,602
Canada’s Police Officers by City - Top 10
CMA Officers % Change
Number per 100,000 2018>2019
Toronto, ON 4,790 162 -3.0%
Montreal, QC 4,295 212 -5.0%
Calgary,  AB 2,123 162 +6.0%
Peel Region,  ON 2,002 144 +1.0%
Edmonton,  AB 1,885 188 0.0%
York Region, ON 1,543 134 +3.0%
Winnipeg, MB 1,405 186 +2.0%
Vancouver, BC 1,330 196 -1.0%
Ottawa, ON 1,223 121 -1.0%
Durham Region, ON 904 132 +3.0%
POLICING ACROSS CANADA: 
FACTS & FIGURES
According to a  recent report 
released by Statistics Canada, 
there  were 68,718 active police 
officers across Canada in 2019. 
This represented an increase of 
+186 officers from the previous 
year. Ontario had the most police officers at 25,340, 
while the Yukon had the least at 131. With a national 
population of 37,589,262, Canada’s average cop per 
pop ratio was 183  police officers per 100,000 
residents.  
Total population: 37,589,262
Source: Statistics Canada, “Police Resources in Canada, 
2019”, Catalogue no:  85-002-X, December 8, 2020
2019
RCMP Training Academy 
& Forensic Labs  252
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2019 FAST FACTS
• On the snapshot day of May 15, 2019 there were 
68,718 police officers in Canada. There were an 
additional 26,878 civilians, 2,621 special 
constables and 2,200 recruits.  
• Saskatchewan had the highest provincial rate of 
police strength at 203  officers per 100,000 
residents (cop to pop ratio) followed closely  by 
Nova Scotia  and Manitoba both at 191  officers per 
100,000. The Northwest Territories had the  highest 
territorial cop to pop ratio at 433  officers per 
100,000.
• Police responded to 13.5 million calls for service 
in 2018/2019. This is up +6.0% over the previous 
year (2017/2018). Municipal police services 
handled 67%  of the calls for service, follow by the 
RCMP (22%), provincial police (11%) and First 
Nations police services (1%). First Nations police, 
however, responded to a higher ratio of calls 
(90,228 calls per 100,000 population) followed by 
municipal police  services (38,871 calls per 
100,000), the OPP (37,689), the RCMP (36,308), 
the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary (25,697) 
and the Sûreté du Québec (20,206).
• 55% of officers were 40 years of age or older.
• Overall, the proportion of police officers aged 50 
and older has grown. Officers 50 years of age  or 
older accounted for 18% of officers.
• For municipal police services serving a  population 
of 100,000 or more, Victoria, BC had the highest 
police strength at 214 officers per 100,000. This 
was followed by Montreal, QC (212) and Halifax, 
NS (209). Richelieu-Saint-Laurent, QC had the 
lowest police strength at 102 officers per 100,000.
Retirement Eligible Police Officers    
by Province/Territory 
Province/Territory Eligible to Retire %
YK 18%
NB 17%
PEI 17%
NL 15%
NS 15%
QU 13%
BC 12%
NWT 12%
NU 10%
SK 9%
MB 9%
ON 8%
AB 6%
Provincial/Territory 10%
RCMP Operation & 
Corporate HQ, Depot and 
Forensic Labs
41%
Canada 11%
Calls For Service per 100,000 Population
Police Service 2017/2018 2018/2019
First Nations 85,780 90,228
Municipal 36,813 38,371
OPP 36,031 37,689
RCMP 33,744 36,308
RNC 16,929 25,697
SQ 19,605 20,206 RETIREMENT
At the end of the 2018/2019, 11% of police 
officers were eligible to retire. The Yukon had the 
highest proportion of officers that could retire  at 
18%. This was followed by both New Brunswick 
and Prince Edward Island (17%), and both 
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia at 15%. Forty-one 
percent (41%) of officers at RCMP Headquarters, 
the Training Academy and forensic labs could 
retire.
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• There were approximately 236,690 training 
hours devoted to the enforcement of new 
cannabis laws. This included 143,740  hours 
dedicated to SFST (Standardized Field Sobriety 
Testing), 18,830  hours of SFST refresher course, 
and 74,120  hours of DRE (Drug Recognition 
Expert) training. In 2018/2019, a total of 4,725 
police officers successfully completed the SFST 
course, 3,439  officer completed the SFST 
refresher course and 1,002 officers were DRE 
certified.
• 4% of police officers identified as Indigenous.
• Of the officers hired, 50%  were  experienced 
police officers and 50% were recruits.
• Ontario had the highest net gain of police officers 
in 2018/2019 (hirings less departures) at +138 
followed by BC (+119), Alberta (+111) and 
Quebec (+106). Nova Scotia had the highest net 
loss at -11 officers followed by PEI (-6), Nunavut 
(-3), and New Brunswick and the Yukon (-2).
GENDER
There were 15,268 female officers on May 15, 2019 
accounting for 22%  of all officers, or about 1 in 5. 
This was up +325 female officers from 2017/2018.  
Senior officers, such as chiefs, deputy  chiefs, 
superintendents, inspectors and other equivalent 
ranks, were 18.9%  female. Non-commissioned 
officers, such as sergeants, were 20.0%  female. 
Constables were 23.3% female.
Of the municipal police services serving a 
population of 100,000 or more, Longueuil had the 
highest percentage of female officers at 35%, 
followed by Montreal (33%) and St. John’s (30%).
RANKS
Most police officers were of constable rank (68%) 
followed by non-commissioned officers (27%) and 
commissioned officers (5%). 
Of the non-commissioned ranks, 21%  were 
corporals, 64% sergeants, 13% staff-sergeants and 
the remaining 2% were other ranks.
Of the commissioned ranks, 31% were inspectors, 
31% senior constables, 10%  superintendents, 8% 
commissioned lieutenants and 20% other 
commissioned officers. 
RCMP Officers by Type of Policing - Canada 2019 (numbers do not include members at HQ & Training Academy)
Level / Region BC AB SK MN ON QC NB NS PEI NL YK NWT NU Total
Contract 5,972 2,877 1,171 913 - - 703 846 96 427 120 175 121 13,421
Federal & 
Other
765 401 130 129 1,749 886 115 121 22 75 11 19 14 4,437
Total 6,737 3,278 1,301 1,042 1,749 886 818 967 118 502 131 194 135 17,858
Hirings
Province/Territory Experienced Recruit
YK - -
NB 97% 3%
PEI 100% -
NL 59% 41%
NS 100% -
QU 45% 55%
BC 79% 21%
NWT 100% -
NU 100% -
SK 91% 9%
MB 79% 21%
ON 24% 76%
AB 67% 33%
Canada 50% 50%
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SEALING, SEIZING & TOWING 
VEHICLE FROM PROPERTY 
LAWFUL
R. v. Iraheta, 2020 ONCA 766
The police obtained a warrant to 
search a dwelling for marijuana and 
drug paraphernalia after receiving 
information from a confidential 
i n f o r m e r. W h i l e c o n d u c t i n g 
surveillance of the premises, police saw a person 
matching the accused’s description leave the 
property in a  vehicle. After stopping the vehicle and 
identifying the accused as its driver, the police 
detained and subsequently arrested him. The same 
day, the police executed the search warrant at the 
accused’s premises. Upon entering the unit from 
both its front and rear, the police discovered that 
there were two separate units with a family 
unrelated to the accused residing  in the front unit. 
After realizing  that the accused resided in the rear 
unit, the police vacated the front unit and 
proceeded to search the rear unit.
While searching the accused’s residence, the police 
d i scovered seve ra l p roh ib i t ed f i r ea rms , 
ammunit ion, controlled substances, drug 
paraphernalia, and documents. The police also saw 
a Ford Fusion in the accused’s backyard. They 
observed a safe  through its window. The police 
sealed the doors to the vehicle and arranged for it 
to be towed to the police garage. The following day, 
the police executed an additional warrant to search 
the vehicle, where they discovered weapons, 
ammunition, drugs, and counterfeit money.
The accused was charged with several firearm 
related offences, possessing a controlled substance 
for the purpose of trafficking, and possessing 
counterfeit money. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Among other things, the accused 
challenged the sufficiency of the 
information to obtain the search 
warrants for his residence and his 
vehicle. He alleged that his rights under s. 8 of the 
Charter had been breached. The judge, however, 
rejected the accused’s submissions. First, the 
police did not need another search warrant once 
they realized the residential premises was divided 
into two units. The police searched the  address for 
which the warrant was authorized and where the 
target of the investigation allegedly resided. 
Second, the warrant was issued on the basis of 
reasonable grounds. The confidential informer’s 
information was compelling, credible  and 
corroborated. Finally, the seizure of he vehicle 
was lawful. The  police sealed its doors and towed 
it to the  police garage. The warrant to search it 
was based on reasonable grounds. 
The accused was convicted of possessing a loaded 
prohibited firearm and possessing a prohibited 
firearm. He was sentenced to 96 months in prison 
less 44 months for pre-sentence custody.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued the search 
warrant for his residence was 
facially invalid because it did 
not particularize the specific unit 
to be searched in the multi-unit premises. He also 
contended that the information to obtain the search 
warrant was insufficient because it was not 
sufficiently corroborated and the police  improperly 
exceeded the scope of the search warrant by 
sealing, seizing and towing the vehicle from the 
property. In his view, the searches of his home and 
his vehicle were serious s. 8 Charter  breaches and 
the evidence ought to have  been excluded under s. 
24(2) of the Charter. He wanted his convictions set 
aside and acquittals entered.
The Search of the Unit
The Court of Appeal rejected the accused’s 
assertion that, once the police learned the search 
warrant did not accurately describe his particular 
unit, they should have  stopped their search and 
obtained further judicial authorization to search it 
unless there were  exigent circumstances. “The 
question of whether a search warrant adequately 
describes a location to be searched depends on the 
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particular circumstances of the case,”  said the 
Court of Appeal.  It continued:
In the particular circumstances of this case, it 
was not necessary for the police to stop their 
search in order to obtain another search 
warrant. The search warrant adequately 
described the location to be searched: it 
correctly stated that the search was for the 
dwelling unit located at 1 Cobbler Crescent, 
which is where the [accused] lived. There is no 
dispute that at the time of the search, the 
[accused] resided with his co-accused girlfriend 
and her two young children in the rear unit of 1 
Cobbler Crescent. That another family lived in 
the front unit of the same address, a fact 
unknown to the police when they applied for 
the warrant, does not, by itself, render the 
warrant’s description inadequate.
As the application judge found, there was no 
indication from the outside that the house was 
divided into multiple units: 1 Cobbler Crescent 
is a small, one-storey detached house; there 
were no separate unit numbers; there was one 
mailbox, one doorbell, and one utility meter. 
Surveillance would not have assisted the police 
in discerning that there were two units. As there 
was no indication from the outside of the 
dwelling house that it contained two units, 
various comings and goings would not have 
alerted the police to the existence of two units.
The police had clear boundaries to search the 
[accused’s] unit and did not have to look past 
the warrant:. They searched the precise location 
of the target specified in the search warrant, 
namely, the dwelling unit located at 1 Cobbler 
Crescent, which is where the [accused] resided. 
They conducted the search in a reasonable 
manner. They only searched the rear unit. Upon 
entering the front unit occupied by the other 
tenant, the police realized their mistake and left 
the front unit. [reference omitted, paras. 15-17]
Sufficiency of the ITO
Although he conceded the information from the 
informer was compelling, the accused suggested 
the police required a higher level of corroboration 
because  the search warrant was based on the 
information of an untested, first-time confidential 
informer. He also argued that the accused’s 
criminal record could not be used to corroborate 
the informer’s information. But the Court of Appeal 
disagreed, finding the application judge made no 
error in determining that the ITO was sufficient and 
the search warrant was validly issued.
“It is well established that each Debot factor 
[whether the information is compelling, credible 
and corroborated] does not form a separate test 
but that it is the totality of the circumstances that 
must meet the  standard of reasonableness,” said 
the Appeal Court. “Weaknesses in one area may be 
compensated, to some extent, by the strengths in 
the other two Debot factors.” And further:
... As the application judge found, the detailed 
information provided by the confidential 
informant was particularly compelling. She did 
not err in referencing the [accused’s] criminal 
record to corroborate the confidential 
informant’s knowledge of the [accused] and to 
bolster the informant’s credibility. The 
application judge did not rely solely on the 
[accused’s] past involvement in criminal 
activities but was satisfied on all the 
“The seizure of the vehicle was authorized under both s. 489(1)(c) of the 
Criminal Code and s. 11(8) of the CDSA. Under s. 489(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, 
the police were entitled to seize any thing that they believed on reasonable 
grounds would afford evidence in respect of an offence. Furthermore, the 
provisions of s. 11(8) of the CDSA ... permits the seizure of ‘any thing that the 
peace officer believes on reasonable grounds has been obtained by or used in 
the commission of an offence or that will afford evidence in respect of an 
offence’.”
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circumstances that she outlined in detail that 
there were reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe there would be evidence of a criminal 
offence in 1 Cobbler Crescent. ... [para. 24]
The Vehicle Seizure
The accused’s suggestion that the warrantless 
seizure of his vehicle from the backyard was 
without lawful authority was also rejected:
... The seizure of the vehicle was authorized 
under both s.  489(1)(c) of the Criminal Code 
and s. 11(8) of the CDSA. Under s. 489(1)(c) of 
the Criminal Code, the police were entitled to 
seize any thing that they believed on 
reasonable grounds would afford evidence in 
respect of an offence. Furthermore, the 
provisions of s. 11(8) of the CDSA do not limit 
the police to the things mentioned in the 
warrant. Notably, “in addition to the things 
mentioned in the warrant”, s. 11(8) permits the 
seizure of “any thing that the peace officer 
believes on reasonable grounds has been 
obtained by or used in the commission of an 
offence or that will afford evidence in respect 
of an offence.”
Here , the ev idence o f the f i rea rms , 
ammunition, controlled substances, and drug 
paraphernalia, as well as the presence of the 
safe in plain view in the [accused’s] Ford 
Fusion vehicle, informed the police’s belief on 
reasonable grounds that the vehicle would 
“afford evidence in respect of an offence.” In 
our view, in light of the evidence of firearms 
and drugs in the [accused’s] residence, it was 
both reasonable and necessary for the police to 
secure and tow the Ford Fusion vehicle that 
likely contained similar items away from the 
house and property, where children were 
present, to the police garage for safe-keeping 
until a warrant could be obtained for its search. 
[paras. 29-30]
Since there were no Charter breaches, it was 
unnecessary to consider s. 24(2).
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
NO DETENTION WHILE 
VISITING REMANDED 
PRISONER: s. 10(b) NOT 
REQUIRED
R. v. Saretzky, 2020 ABCA 421
 
Within a  five day period, three 
murders occurred in a smal l 
community. One involved the killing 
of a 27-year-old man and his 2-year- 
old daughter, while the other 
involved the death of a 67-year-old woman. The 
police believed the killings were  related. Following 
the deaths of the man and his daughter, the 
accused became a suspect. During interactions 
with the  accused, the police properly Chartered 
and cautioned him. The accused eventually offered 
a confession to killing the man and his daughter. 
This confession followed consultation with counsel. 
While the accused was being held in a remand 
centre on the murder charges, a police officer 
visited him. However, when the accused was 
advised by a corrections officer that the officer was 
there  to speak with him, the accused declined the 
meeting. Two months later the officer again 
returned to the remand centre for another 
unscheduled meeting. This time, the accused 
agreed to speak  to the officer. The meeting took 
place in the barber shop of the remand centre. The 
officer and the accused were the only  two people 
in the room and the door, which could only be 
opened from the outside, was closed.
The officer told the accused he was not under 
arrest, was not being forced to be there, and was 
free to go. The officer explained that the door was 
locked, but if the accused wanted to go he just had 
to let the officer know. The officer also told the 
accused he was still under investigation for the 
killing of the 67-year-old woman. He also advised 
the accused that anything he said could be used as 
evidence in court. The accused said he understood. 
During the meeting, the accused acknowledged 
killing the woman. He was again told he could 
leave but nevertheless went on to describe her 
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killing in detail. The accused was also then charged 
with a  third count of murder for the death of the 
woman.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The police officer said he did not provide 
a s. 10(b) Charter advisement because the 
accused was not detained. The judge 
found the accused was not detained at 
anytime during the meeting when he confessed to 
the killing and therefore a s. 10(b) warning was not 
required. The accused believed he had a choice 
whether to speak to the police or not, and the 
officer made it absolutely clear that he could leave 
whenever he wanted to. Furthermore, the  judge 
found the accused’s confession was freely  and 
voluntarily made. The accused was convicted of 
three-counts of first-degree murder and sentenced 
to life in prison without eligibility for parole until 
serving 75 years.  
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused argued that he had 
been deta ined dur ing the 
meeting when he confessed to 
killing the  67-year-old woman 
and therefore the police officer was required to 
advise him of his s. 10(b) Charter  right to counsel. 
The Crown, on the other hand, submitted that the 
accused was not detained. 
Psychological Detention
“The Charter requires that upon arrest or 
detention (physical or psychological) the  police 
must advise the detainee of his/her s. 10 rights,” 
said Justice Martin speaking for the  Court of 
Appeal. “Section 10(b) informs the detainee of the 
right to retain and instruct counsel without delay 
and offers an opportunity to exercise that right. ...  
Importantly, that right is only  triggered on arrest 
or detention. ... Generally, a person is detained 
when he or she submits or acquiesces to any form 
o f c o m p u l s o r y r e s t r a i n t ( p hy s i c a l o r 
psychological), exerted by the police, reasonably 
believing they have no choice to do otherwise.”
In this case, Justice Martin noted the issue was 
whether the accused was psychologically detained:
[Psychological detention] will occur when the 
individual remains in response to a legal 
obligation to comply with a restrictive direction 
or demand made by police. Psychological 
detention may also be found to exist absent 
legal compulsion where the conduct of the 
police would cause a reasonable person in the 
subject’s position to conclude that they were 
not free to leave but had to cooperate with the 
police. The cases speak in terms of feeling 
unable to leave, obliged to comply, and unable 
to decline to cooperate. The emphasis is on 
acquiescing to a loss of liberty reasonably 
believing there is no choice to do otherwise. It 
is the perceived loss of choice which creates a 
psychological detention.
The onus is on the [accused] to show that the 
circumstances they were facing amounted to 
detention. “The test is an objective one and the 
failure of the applicant to testify as to his or her 
perceptions of the encounter is not fatal to the 
application”. [references omitted, paras. 32-33]
Justice Martin then identified relevant facts of 
particular significance in this case:
• The accused declined the invitation to meet 
with the same officer two months earlier.
• At the outset of the meeting the accused was 
told, and indicated he understood, that he did 
not have to stay and talk, that he was free to 
leave at anytime, and that he was still a  suspect 
in the killing of the 67-year-old woman and that 
anything he said about that offence could be 
used as evidence.
“Section 10(b) informs the detainee of the right to retain and instruct counsel 
without delay and offers an opportunity to exercise that right. ...  Importantly, that 
right is only triggered on arrest or detention”
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• Having been given that advice, the accused 
elected to stay and talk. Then, immediately after 
admitting to the killing, but before providing any 
details of the killing, he was told again that he 
could leave the room whenever he wished and 
need not stay if he did not want to. He elected 
to stay and provide a full account of the killing.
 
“Put simply, the [accused] had the  choice to attend 
the meeting, the choice to end the meeting at 
anytime and the  choice to answer the questions or 
decline to do so,” said Justice Martin. Nor did 
focussed questioning necessarily trigger a 
detention. “In my opinion, focussed questioning, 
like focussed suspicion, ‘...in and of itself, does not 
turn the encounter into a detention. What matters 
is how the police ... interacted with the subject.’ In 
other words, mere focussed questioning that does 
not arouse the feeling that the  choice to walk away 
is lost, does not create a detention.” (references 
omitted). 
 
Nor would an analysis of the circumstances of the 
encounter, nature of the police conduct, or 
characteristics of the accused change the result:
     
• Circumstances of the encounter: The 
accused would know (1) he could have declined 
the meeting (as he did so two months earlier), 
(2) he was still as suspect in the woman’s 
murder and (3) he did not have to talk to the 
police officer. He was also told repeatedly and 
acknowledged that he understood he cold end 
the meeting and leave at anytime he wished. “I 
disagree that by virtue of being a suspect, the 
officer was legally obliged to remind the 
[accused] of his s. 10(b) rights,” said Justice 
Martin. “That may have been the prudent 
course but it is not the law. The triggering 
words in s. 10 of the Charter are restricted to: 
‘Everyone has the right on arrest or 
detention...’, and not: ‘Everyone has the right 
on arrest or detention, or on being suspected of 
having committed a crime...’.” 
• Nature of Police Conduct: The officer 
was polite  and respectful throughout, and told 
the accused that he did not have to stay and talk 
and could leave at anytime. But, even though 
the door was locked and the accused’s liberty 
and movements were strictly controlled, his 
freedom to choose to meet and talk with the 
officer was not lost or impaired. “In the unique 
circumstances of this case, the [accused’s] 
refusal to meet with the officer when invited to 
do so only two months before, and the 
repeated advice that he need not stay or talk 
but could return to his cell if and when he 
wished, overcame any suggestion that his being 
an inmate denied him the freedom of choice to 
leave the interview room and return to his 
cell.”
• Characteristics of the accused: There 
was no evidence to support the accused’s claim 
that he was an unsophisticated and broken man 
at the time of the interview. 
The accused was not detained and therefore he was 
not entitled to be reminded of his s. 10(b) rights. 
And, even if the accused’s s. 10(b) rights were 
triggered, the accused’s confession would not have 
been excluded under s. 24(2).   
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able Quote
“I learned that courage was not the 
absence of fear, but the triumph over 
it. The brave man is not he who does 
not feel afraid, but he who conquers 
that fear.”
~Nelson Mandela~
“The triggering words in s. 10 of the Charter are restricted to: ‘Everyone has the 
right on arrest or detention...’, and not: ‘Everyone has the right on arrest or 
detention, or on being suspected of having committed a crime...’.” 
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RACIAL PROFILING CLAIM 
REJECTED: NO EVIDENCE 
ACCUSED TARGETED BECAUSE 
OF SKIN COLOUR
R. v. Davis, 2020 ONCA 748
During the course of an unrelated 
investigation into shoplifting, the 
accused was observed making what 
appeared to be a drug transaction 
with another individual. He was then 
arrested for trafficking drugs after police observed 
what they believed was a second drug transaction 
at a different location. The accused had just 
returned to his vehicle  and entered its driver’s side 
when the police moved in for the arrest. An officer 
approached from the passenger side  of the vehicle 
and saw the accused put something down his 
waistband. He described it as a “plastic, clear bag 
like a ziplock bag.”  After the accused was arrested, 
he was placed on the sidewalk beside the car. He 
was handcuffed behind his back. An officer 
searched the accused and found a clear plastic 
sandwich bag containing an ounce of crack 
cocaine in a pouch on his waistband. In the 
accused’s front pockets, police found two large 
bundles of cash and a cell phone. The accused was 
then told he was also under arrest for possession for 
the purpose of trafficking. He was read his s. 10(b) 
Charter right to counsel and was cautioned. 
Police searched the accused’s car and found a 
scale, identification, a car rental agreement, various 
receipts and a small amount of marihuana. The 
accused was transported to the police station where 
a strip search was authorized by a supervisor. He 
was subsequently charged with possessing cocaine 
for the purpose of trafficking, trafficking in cocaine 
and possessing property (money) obtained by 
crime. 
Ontario Court of Justice
Among other submissions, the  accused 
argued he was racially profiled and that 
the police had no reasonable grounds for 
his arrest, thus violating s. 9 of the 
Charter. In addition, he contended that the strip 
searches of his underwear at the scene of the arrest 
and then later at the police station were 
unreasonable and breached s. 8 of the Charter . 
The judge found the officer had reasonable  grounds 
to arrest the accused, both subjectively and 
objectively. Furthermore, the judge  rejected the 
accused’s suggestion that the police engaged in 
racialized thinking. The judge found there was no 
evidence that the accused was targeted because of 
his skin colour. As for the search at the scene of the 
arrest, the judge found it was nothing more invasive 
than searching the accused’s waistband area and 
finding a plastic bag with drugs. “I also find that 
[the accused’s] actions in secreting contraband 
down his pants when first confronted by the police 
was sufficiently  exigent to warrant [the officer] 
searching his waistband to retrieve the baggie,” 
said the  judge.  “Even if [the accused] was 
handcuffed upon arrest it is verging on absurd to 
suggest that the police had to leave the drugs in 
his waistband until they arrived at the police 
station. I would not do so.  There is no evidence 
that the  search of his waistband at the roadside 
involved anything more than [the officer] reaching 
into the waistband portion of the underwear and 
pulling out the  drugs.  No clothes were removed.  
By all accounts it was a very brief single action.  
There  was no aspect of violation of [the accused’s] 
personal privacy in the search. The roadside search 
did not lead to a Charter violation.”
The strip search at the police  station, which was 
authorized by a supervisor, followed the fact the 
accused had tried to hide contraband in his 
underwear. The strip search was required to rule out 
whether there was anything more in his underwear. 
This strip search was conducted in less then three 
minutes, occurred in a private room and was 
conducted by  officers of the same gender. It was 
nothing more invasive than a visual inspection of 
the accused’s genitals and anal areas, and there 
was no evidence of any  real physical contact. But 
other than a video showing the accused and two 
officers going  into and out of the room for the 
search, no real record was made of it. This minor 
deviation from search protocol by not keeping a 
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record of the manner in which the strip search was 
conducted, however, was insufficient upon which 
to find a Charter breach.
The accused was convicted of trafficking cocaine, 
possessing cocaine  for the  purpose of trafficking 
and possessing proceeds of crime. He was 
sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused again argued, in 
part, that the trial judge erred in 
finding that the police had 
reasonable grounds to arrest 
him and in concluding that he was not searched 
unreasonably.
Reasonable Grounds for Arrest
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge did not 
err in finding the officer had the necessary 
subjective grounds for arresting the accused and 
that those grounds were objectively reasonable:
The police observed two people they had under 
surveillance stand outside the door on the 
driver’s side of the [accused’s] car at a shopping 
plaza, after which they walked back to their car 
with something in hand. The police arrested 
them and found a crack pipe and 3.3 grams of 
crack cocaine, but no money. We agree with 
the Crown that the grounds for arresting the 
[accused] were enhanced when the police 
observed a similar event when the [accused] 
was parked at another plaza – a person walked 
up to his car door and reached into it before 
walking away quickly. Although a hand-to-hand 
transfer was not observed, [the officer], who 
has considerable experience in drug-related 
investigations, thought that these were 
exchanges of drugs for money and his view was 
objectively reasonable. There was ample basis 
for arresting the [accused] after not one but two 
transactions consistent with drug trafficking 
were observed.
 
The accused accepted that if the grounds for arrest 
were sufficient then the question of racial profiling 
did not arise.
The Roadside Search
The search incident to arrest that occurred at the 
scene of the arrest involved an officer reaching into 
the accused’s waistband and pulling out a bag of 
contraband. As the trial judge held, the search 
involved nothing more than an officer “reaching 
into the waistband portion of the underwear and 
pulling out the drugs.” No clothes were removed at 
the scene of the arrest. The grounds for doing this 
arose from the fact that the accused had been seen 
placing that bag into his underwear just prior to his 
arrest. The trial judge did not err in holding that this 
search was incident to arrest. The recovery  of the 
contraband at the scene of the arrest did not breach 
s. 8 of the Charter. 
The Strip Search
The strip search conducted at the  police station was 
also reasonable in the circumstances. The accused 
had already been seen placing contraband in his 
underwear and it had been recovered from the 
search incident to arrest. The Court of Appeal saw 
no error in the trial judge’s conclusion that the strip 
search was reasonable in the circumstances. As for 
the manner in which the search was conducted, it 
was not more invasive than necessary. “The trial 
judge found that the search was  conducted in 
under three minutes, by officers of the same 
gender, in a private room, and that there was no 
evidence of anything more than a visual inspection 
of the [accused’s] genitals and anal areas,” said the 
Court of Appeal. Furthermore, the trial judge found 
that the search was conducted in accordance with 
the guidelines set out by the Supreme Court  of 
Canada in R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83 except for 
making a  record of the manner in which the search 
was conducted. Nevertheless, the trial judge found 
tha t th i s was a “minor dev iat ion f rom 
the  Golden  guidelines, insufficient to found 
a Charter breach.” 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s Note: Additional details taken from R. v. 
Davis, 2019 ONCJ 254.
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The number of Reports to 
C r o w n C o u n s e l ( R C C s ) 
received by the BC Prosecution 
Service from investigative agencies in fiscal 2019/20. 
These  RCCs represented a total of 75,169 accused 
persons. This was an increase of 2.1% over last year.
Source: BC Prosecution Service, “Annual Report - 2019/20”, accessed 
December 11, 2020. 
. . . a s a 
percentage 
of overall 
accused named in an RCC submitted to the BC 
Prosecution Service has declined over the last three 
years.
... were the investigative agency 
most likely  to submit an RCC to 
the BC Prosecution Service. In 
fiscal 2019/20, police 
agencies submitted 
57,609 RCCs. This 
was followed by BC 
Corrections (12,726) 
and other investigative 
agenc i e s such a s 
wildlife conservation 
or financial regulators 
(1,556).
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... was the BC Prosecution Services 
overall charge approval rate for 
RCCs submitted by investigative 
agencies. Of the 75,169 people named in RCCs for 
which their was a final charge assessment decision 
made in fiscal 2019/209, 59,688 were charged, an 
84%  charge approval rate. Of the  remaining 
accused, 14% were not charged and 2%  were 
referred to alternative measures.
The percentage of prosecutions 
resulting in a conviction by way of 
a guilty plea or guilty verdict at 
trial. Of the 56,268 prosecutions concluded in 
2019/20, 59%  had a guilty finding, 1% were not 
guilty, 5% entered into a peace bond, 34%  had 
their charges stayed, and 1%  were concluded 
otherwise, such as a finding of unfit to stand trial or 
not criminally responsible due to a mental disorder.
... was the most common reason why a prosecution 
was concluded with a Judicial Stay of Proceedings. 
In fiscal 2019/20 there was a total of 8  prosecutions 
judicially stayed for a variety of legal reasons. This 
is down from previous years.
The time it 
takes for 
BC Crown 
Counsel to undertake a  charge assessment in most 
cases. From the date an RCC is received until 
Crown Counsel makes a charge decision, 53% of 
cases take three days or less. 66% of decisions are 
made within 7 days, 78% within 15 days and 87% 
within 30 days. The percentage of files approved 
within these charge assessment durations are down 
from last year in all categories.  
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The number of s. 810.1 and s. 810.2 
Criminal Code applications filed in court. 
This is a decrease over the previous two 
years.
The median number 
of days (net of bench 
warrant days) it takes 
for a file  to conclude from the time an information 
was sworn or filed (a charge laid) to the date that all 
charges on the file  have a final disposition and 
there  are no future scheduled appearances. This is 
an increase over the last two years. 
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41 The report describes ss. 810.1 and 810.2 of teh Criminal Code as follows:
Section 810.1 of the Criminal Code allows for an 
Information to be laid before a provincial court 
judge for the purpose of having the defendant 
enter into a recognizance including conditions 
that he or she not engage in activity that involves 
contact with persons under 16 years of age and 
prohibiting him or her from attending certain 
places where persons under 16 years of age are 
likely to be present. The judge makes the order 
where satisfied on evidence that there are 
reasonable grounds to fear that the defendant will 
commit certain sexual offences against children 
under 16 years of age. 
Section 810.2 of the Criminal Code allows 
anyone, with the consent of the Attorney General, 
to lay an Information before a provincial court 
judge for the purpose of having the defendant 
enter into a recognizance where there are 
reasonable grounds to fear that the defendant may 
commit a “serious personal injury offence” as 
defined in the Criminal Code. Conditions may be 
imposed, such as a weapons prohibition, to secure 
the good conduct of the defendant. 
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POLICE DID NOT CREATE 
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES BY 
DECISIONS THEY MADE
R. v. Hobeika, 2020 ONCA 750
After receiving information from a 
confidential informer that the 
accused Hobeika was selling various 
drugs out of his car and the 
condominium (Liberty Village) where 
he lived, the police obtained search warrants for his 
condominium and his vehicle. The police set up 
surveillance hoping to execute both warrants when 
he was in the condominium. Armed with 
information that the vehicle owned by the accused 
was registered to a unit at a different condominium 
in Etobicoke, officers went there and located the 
accused’s vehicle in its parking lot. An officer 
checked the directory inside the front door of the 
Etobicoke condominium building and learned the 
accused was listed as the occupant of one of its 
units. The lead investigator, who had considerable 
experience in drug investigations, concluded the 
accused may be operating his drug business out of 
both condominiums. Police then decided to 
prepare an Information to Obtain (ITO) a warrant 
for the Etobicoke condominium as well.
While  wai t ing outs ide of the Etobicoke 
condominium, the police received information that 
a person living  there had been previously  charged 
about two years earlier with drug trafficking. This 
person had been released on bail with the accused 
as his surety and was required to live at the 
accused’s unit. The lead investigator decided that, if 
the accused left the Etobicoke condominium and 
went to his car, the vehicle would be stopped and 
the search warrant for the car executed.
The police saw the accused and another person 
leave the Etobicoke condominium and go to the 
vehicle. When the accused entered the vehicle, the 
lead investigator ordered the vehicle blocked and 
instructed officers to execute the search warrant for 
the vehicle. Police could smell marihuana in the 
car and saw a significant quantity of marihuana in 
the pocket of the front door. The officers also found 
drugs in the possession of the vehicle’s passenger. 
The accused was arrested for possessing marihuana 
and he was advised of his right to counsel. He 
wanted to exercise his right to counsel and named 
a specific lawyer he wanted to speak with. The 
vehicle stop and arrest, which was loud and public, 
occurred in plain view of the condominium’s 
entrance. The accused had a cell phone and at least 
three  individuals exited the condominium while the 
stop and arrest were  taking place. They were seen 
using their cell phones and one of them 
immediately went back into the building.
Although the police did not yet have a search 
warrant for the  Etobicoke condominium unit, the 
lead investigator decided the police would enter 
the building and make a warrantless entry of the 
accused’s unit. In his view, there  were reasonable 
grounds to believe there was evidence of narcotics 
trafficking in the unit and there was a real risk 
evidence would be destroyed if he did not act 
immediately to enter. Using a key fob seized from 
the accused on arrest, the police entered the 
common area of the condominium building and 
proceeded to the accused’s unit. Officers could 
hear someone inside  the unit. The lead investigator 
knocked on the door to the unit, identified himself 
as a police officer, and said he was there to perform 
a bail compliance check. Steps could be heard in 
the unit moving  away from the door. Police broke 
the door open with a battering ram, entered the 
unit, spread out, and conducted a quick visual 
examination of the premises to locate any persons 
inside. During this clearing search for safety 
purposes, an officer saw chunks of cocaine powder 
and a number of Ziplock baggies. The accused 
Sanchez, who was sitting at a table beside a jar 
containing psilocybin, was arrested and advised of 
his right to counsel. The police “froze”  the scene 
to await the arrival of the search warrant. The 
observations made during the warrantless entry 
were included in the ITO for the Etobicoke 
condominium.
When the lead investigator arrived back at the 
police station some six  hours after Hobeika’s arrest, 
he tried to contact his named lawyer but learned 
the lawyer had been suspended from practice. 
Hobeika was offered duty counsel. He accepted the 
offer and spoke with them.
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As a result of searching both condominium units, 
the police located a substantial quantity  of various 
drugs and cash. Subsequent police investigation led 
to the seizure of funds from the accused Hobeika’s 
bank accounts and other locations. In total, the 
police seized about $400,000 in cash and bank 
drafts. Hobeika was charged with four counts of 
possessing controlled substances for the purpose of 
trafficking, three counts of possessing proceeds of 
crime (money) and one count of money laundering. 
Sanchez was charged with four counts of 
possessing controlled substances for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Among o ther ru l ings , the judge 
concluded the police could only rely on 
s. 11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA) if they had the 
necessary reasonable grounds to enter the 
condominium and the necessary urgency to do so 
without a warrant. As for the necessary reasonable 
grounds, the judge found the police could not rely 
on information gained when standing outside of the 
unit’s door. But even without that information, the 
police had probable cause to enter Hobeika’s unit 
when they entered the common area of the 
condominium. These grounds included:
• Information from a reliable confidential 
informer;
• Hobeika was connected to the  condominium: 
he was designated as an occupant in the 
building registry; his licence and car ownership 
showed the condominium as his residence; he 
possessed the key fob for the front entry to the 
condominium; and his vehicle having been 
parked in the parking lot beside the 
condominium;
• When he was arrested immediately after leaving 
the condominium he was in possession of drugs. 
More drugs were found in the car, and in the 
possession of the  passenger. It could be inferred 
Hobeika and his passenger had just left 
Hobeika’s unit; and
• A third party  living at the condominium building 
had been charged with drug trafficking about 
two years earlier and under the terms of his bail, 
was required to live in the accused’s unit.
 
As for urgency, the judge held the  location and 
nature of the stopping  of the  accused’s vehicle and 
his arrest made it reasonably probable the arrest 
could quickly come to the attention of a  person or 
persons in the condominium unit or with quick 
access to it. Those persons could destroy evidence 
in the unit before the police could obtain and 
execute a search warrant. 
The judge concluded the requisite  urgency was 
established before the police entered the building . 
Therefore, the judge did not need to decide 
whether the police could rely on the additional 
information obtained while standing  at Hobeika’s 
door. The judge also rejected the suggestion that the 
police created the very exigent circumstances they 
were relying on to justify the warrantless entry by 
making the decision to execute the search warrant 
on the vehicle  and arrest Hobeika in plain view of 
the entrance to the condominium building. In the 
judge’s view, the police had no intention of 
searching Hobeika’s vehicle in front of the 
condominium. The police were merely maintaining 
surveillance, waiting for the anticipated warrant for 
Hobeika’s unit and wanted to execute it while he 
was in it. But Hobeika happened to leave his unit 
and enter the vehicle.
The judge also ruled that Hobeika’s s. 10(b) right to 
counsel had not been breached as a  result of the 
delay in accessing counsel. “While there is some 
evidence of delay in facilitating the exercise by Mr. 
Hobeika of his right to counsel, [Hobeika] has 
failed to lead sufficient evidence to persuade me 
that this delay was unreasonable in the 
circumstances,” said the judge.
Hobeika and Sanchez were convicted on all 
counts. Hobeika was sentenced to 8½ years 
imprisonment less pre-sentence custody. Sanchez 
was sentenced to 4½ years’ imprisonment less pre-
sentence custody. The  judge also ordered the 
forfeiture  of all cash found in Hobeika’s possession 
and his Etobicoke condominium as “offence-
related property”.
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Ontario Court of Appeal
It was argued that the police did 
n o t h av e t h e n e c e s s a r y 
reasonable grounds to enter 
H o b e i k a ’s c o n d o m i n i u m 
building and his unit. In addition, it was contended 
the police failed to show the requisite  urgent 
circumstances justifying the warrantless entry  of the 
condominium and the subsequent entry and search 
of the unit. In Hobeika’s view, there was no 
evidence the police knew someone was inside his 
unit or had immediate access to it. Further, it was 
suggested that whatever urgency existed was 
created by the  tactical decisions made by police 
and could not be relied upon to make out the 
urgency required to justify a  warrantless exigent 
circumstances entry.   
The Crown, on the other hand, contended that the 
entry  and safety search, although warrantless, was 
authorized under s. 11(7) of the CDSA. Not only 
did the police have the necessary reasonable 
grounds for the entry, exigent circumstances existed 
so that a warrant was not required. 
s. 11(7) CDSA
Section 11(7) of the CDSA reads:
A police officer may exercise any of the powers 
described in subsection (1), (5) or (6) without a 
warrant if the conditions for obtaining a warrant 
exist, but by reasons of exigent circumstances it 
would be impracticable to obtain one.
Justice Doherty, authoring the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, noted that s. 11(7) has two prerequisites: 
(1) the probable  cause requirement and (2) the 
urgency requirement. “First, ‘the conditions for 
obtaining a warrant’ must exist at the time the 
warrantless entry and search are conducted,”  he 
said. “Second, it must be impracticable to obtain a 
warrant ‘by reasons of exigent circumstances’.” He 
continued:
The first requirement, sometimes referred to as 
the probable cause requirement, is determined 
by asking whether the police had adequate 
grounds to obtain a warrant to search the 
location they entered without a warrant. That 
assessment is made based on the facts the 
police knew or reasonably should have known 
when the entry was made. [references omitted, 
para. 36]
Although Justice Doherty noted the police made 
two entries (one into the common area  of the 
condominium and the second into the Hobeika’s 
unit), he opined it would be artificial to draw a 
distinction between the two for the purpose of 
determining whether the police had the necessary 
probable cause to enter. Thus, the probable cause 
requirement had to be made out at the  time the 
police entered the condominium common area 
without relying on any information gained while 
standing outside Hobeika’s door.
Probable Cause Requirement
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge did not 
err in holding that the probable cause (reasonable 
grounds) requirement of s. 11(7) to enter the 
accused’s unit at the time the police entered the 
condominium building had been met. 
Urgency Requirement
In R. v. Patterson, 2017 SCC 15, the  Supreme Court 
of Canada explained the meaning of exigent 
circumstances for the purposes of s. 11(7):
So understood, then, “impracticable” within the 
meaning of s. 11(7) contemplates that the 
exigent nature of the circumstances are such 
The first requirement, sometimes 
referred to as the probable cause 
requirement, is determined by asking 
whether the police had adequate 
grounds to obtain a warrant to search 
the location they entered without a 
warrant. That assessment is made 
based on the facts the police knew or 
reasonably should have known when 
the entry was made.”
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that taking time to obtain a warrant would 
seriously undermine the objective of police 
action – whether it be preserving evidence, 
officer safety or public safety.
In sum, I conclude that, in order for a 
warrantless entry to satisfy s. 11(7), the Crown 
must show that the entry was compelled by 
urgency, calling for immediate police action to 
preserve evidence, officer safety or public 
safety. Further, this urgency must be shown to 
have been such that taking the time to obtain a 
warrant would pose serious risk to those 
imperatives.
Justice Doherty  found the s. 11(7) urgency 
requirement had also been met. When the  lead 
investigator decided to enter the building and 
proceed to the unit to make a warrantless entry, he 
reasonably believed the circumstances called for 
immediate  action to preserve evidence in the unit, 
and reasonably believed waiting for a warrant 
would put the preservation of that evidence at 
serious risk. 
As for whether the police “knew” someone was in 
Hobeika’s unit or had immediate access to it, 
“knowledge”  was not the standard. “Section 11(7) 
of the CDSA did not require that the  police  have 
actual knowledge someone was in, or could 
readily access the  unit,” said Justice Doherty. 
“Instead, it required the police have reasonable 
grounds to believe there was an imminent risk  that 
evidence in the unit would be destroyed before the 
police  could obtain and execute a warrant. The 
evidence accepted by the trial judge included 
evidence a person released on bail for drug 
trafficking was required to live  in Hobeika’s unit as 
a term of his bail. While it is true  the bail order 
was about two years old, the officers had no 
reason to believe it was not still in effect. That 
evidence provided a basis for the trial judge’s 
finding of an imminent risk that evidence in the 
unit could be destroyed.” 
As well, even assuming the police could not rely on 
what they heard through the door, the Court of 
Appeal upheld the trial judge’s finding that the 
urgency requirement under s. 11(7) was satisfied 
when the police  decided to enter the building. “The 
voices at the doorway served to confirm the 
urgency and also provided justification for the 
forced entry into the unit,” said Justice Doherty.
Police Created Urgency?
The Court of Appeal agreed that exigent 
circumstances would not justify  a warrantless entry 
if those circumstances were the consequence of a 
pre-planned police operation. “The police  cannot 
circumvent the warrant requirement by devising 
and implementing a strategy which creates an 
imminent danger evidence will be destroyed, and 
then rely  on that imminent danger as justification 
for acting without a warrant,”  said Justice 
Doherty” “If the police strategy creates the 
supposed urgency, the circumstances are not 
‘exigent’, but are anticipated, if not planned for, by 
the police.” 
The existence of a causal link between the 
circumstances said to create the need to act 
without a warrant and a police operational decision 
does not necessarily result in a finding  the police 
effectively created the urgency. Moreover, the 
existence of reasonable alternative operational 
decisions does not mean the police created the 
urgency flowing from the decision they did make:
A causative link between the circumstances 
creating the urgency relied on to act without a 
“The police cannot circumvent the warrant requirement by devising and 
implementing a strategy which creates an imminent danger evidence will be 
destroyed, and then rely on that imminent danger as justification for acting 
without a warrant. If the police strategy creates the supposed urgency, the 
circumstances are not ‘exigent’, but are anticipated, if not planned for, by the 
police.” 
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warrant and a police action is a step towards 
showing the police created the urgency. In 
many cases, however, it will be a small step. 
Often, police action will result in the urgency 
relied on to act without a warrant. The question 
is not whether there is some causative link 
between police action and the urgency, but 
rather whether that police action reflects a pre-
existing plan, which included the creation of 
the circumstances said to justify acting without 
a warrant.
Evidence the police could have proceeded in a 
different manner may also have evidentiary 
value when assessing whether the alleged 
exigent circumstances were created by the 
police. The availability of a different strategy 
does not, however, mean that the police 
created the alleged urgency. The question is not 
could the police reasonably have done 
something else, but whether the police 
operational plan would, in its implementation, 
create the very circumstances said to justify 
acting without a warrant. [paras. 54-55]
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s ruling 
that the police did not engage in a pre-planned 
operation that would create circumstances in which 
the police could act without a warrant. The police 
intended to obtain a search warrant and execute 
the war ran t whi le Hobe ika was in the 
condominium. This changed, however, when 
Hobeika left the condominium before  the warrant 
was obtained. The police reacted by choosing to 
execute the warrant on the vehicle, detain and 
subsequently arrest Hobeika. This was not planned 
in advance. “From the police perspective, their 
strategy changed in reaction to a  new situation, 
albeit one the officer in charge had contemplated 
as a possibility while awaiting the warrant,”  said 
Justice Doherty. “The change in circumstances, and 
not any pre-existing police plan, generated the 
exigent circumstances relied on for the warrantless 
entry.”
s. 10(b) Right to Counsel
On appeal, the Crown conceded that the trial judge 
erred in finding there was no s. 10(b) Charter 
breach. And the Court of Appeal agreed that the 
concession was fully supported by the case law. 
“There is no evidence to support a finding that the 
delay in providing access to counsel was 
reasonable  in the circumstances,” said Justice 
Doherty. “Hobeika’s right to counsel under s. 10(b) 
was breached when he was held for over four 
hours before the police took steps to put him in 
touch with counsel.”
s. 24(2) Charter
Despite the  s. 10(b) breach, no evidence was 
excluded under s. 24(2). Just because  an accused 
demonstrates a breach of s. 10(b), they are not 
“Often, police action will result in the urgency relied on to act without a warrant. 
The question is not whether there is some causative link between police action 
and the urgency, but rather whether that police action reflects a pre-existing plan, 
which included the creation of the circumstances said to justify acting without a 
warrant.”
“Evidence the police could have proceeded in a different manner may also have 
evidentiary value when assessing whether the alleged exigent circumstances were 
created by the police. The availability of a different strategy does not, however, 
mean that the police created the alleged urgency. The question is not could the 
police reasonably have done something else, but whether the police operational 
plan would, in its implementation, create the very circumstances said to justify 
acting without a warrant.”
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always entitled to a remedy under s. 24(2). “Section 
24(2) does not create an automatic rule of 
exclusion applicable to evidence obtained in a 
manner that infringed a  constitutional right,”  said 
the Appeal Court. “Instead, s. 24(2) requires the 
accused to establish ‘having regard to all the 
circumstances the admission of it [the  evidence] in 
the proceeding would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute’.” In deciding whether any 
evidence ought to have been excluded, the Court 
of Appeal made the following comments about s. 
24(2):
• “The failure to comply with s. 10(b) for over 
four hours reflects a troubling police 
indifference to Hobeika’s s. 10(b) rights. There 
can be no suggestion of any good faith by the 
police. There can be  no suggestion the police 
were operating in an area  of constitutional 
uncertainty. There are no circumstances that 
might ameliorate, to some degree, the failure to 
comply with s. 10(b). This was a clear violation 
of a long-established and well-understood 
constitutional obligation.”
• “A serious breach of a long-established and 
well-understood constitutional right can lead to 
exclusion of evidence, even where the breach is 
not systemic in nature, or part of a pattern of 
police misconduct.”
• “Exclusion is not, however, automatic. Section 
24(2) requires, in all cases, an approach which 
balances the competing relevant factors, with a 
view to maintaining the  long-term repute  of the 
administration of justice. The court must assess 
the seriousness of the police misconduct, the 
impact on the [accused’s] Charter-protected 
interest , and society’s interest in an 
adjudication on the merits.”
In deciding not to exclude the evidence, Justice 
Doherty concluded:
On the evidence adduced at trial, the breach of 
Hobe ika ’s s . 10 (b ) r i gh t s cannot be 
characterized as the product of an improper 
police protocol, or a systemic failure by the 
police involved in this investigation to meet 
their constitutional obligations. On the 
evidence, the breach was a situation-specific, 
isolated failure, albeit a serious one, by the 
officers who had custody of Hobeika during the 
relevant time period.
[...]
I come down on the side of admissibility. To 
exclude the evidence obtained in the searches 
of the condominiums and Hobeika’s vehicle 
strikes me as using s. 24(2) more to punish the 
offending police officers than to vindicate the 
long-term repute of the criminal justice process. 
[Hobeika] has not established the admission of 
the evidence obtained in the searches would, 
i n a l l t he c i rcums tances , b r ing t he 
administration of justice into disrepute. [paras. 
88, 89]
Both accused had their appeals dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“Section 24(2) does not create an automatic rule of exclusion applicable to 
evidence obtained in a manner that infringed a constitutional right. Instead, s. 
24(2) requires the accused to establish ‘having regard to all the circumstances the 
admission of it [the evidence] in the proceeding would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute’.”
“Exclusion is not, however, automatic. Section 24(2) requires, in all cases, an 
approach which balances the competing relevant factors, with a view to 
maintaining the long-term repute of the administration of justice. The court must 
assess the seriousness of the police misconduct, the impact on the [accused’s] 
Charter-protected interest, and society’s interest in an adjudication on the merits.”
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SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC 
DEVICES  AT THE BORDER 
REVISITED
R. v. Canfield; R. v. Townsend, 
2020 ABCA 383
R. v. Canfield
After arriving at the Edmonton 
International Airport on a flight from 
Cuba, Canfield (a Canadian citizen) 
was referred by a  CBSA Border 
Services Officer (BSO) for secondary 
screening because he was travelling alone, travelled 
regularly to Cuba by himself, and had an overly 
friendly demeanour. He had referred to “women 
and Cuba and the beach”, which the BSO viewed 
as an indicator of sex tourism for women and 
children. At secondary, the BSO noted Canfield was 
breathing heavily, sweating profusely, had cotton 
dry mouth, and his hands were shivering  and 
shaking. Condoms, lubricants and a penis ring 
were found in his luggage. The BSO formed the 
belief that Canfield had child pornography on his 
phone and asked him if there was any. Canfield first 
said, “I’m not sure”  but later said, “Yes”. When 
asked to show the  BSO an image, Canfield did so. 
The BSO then conducted a more detailed search of 
the phone and found more images of child 
pornography. Canfield was arrested, provided his 
rights and cautioned. The  matter was referred to a 
Child Exploitation Unit for further investigation. A 
search warrant was subsequently obtained and 130 
images and 17 videos of child pornography were 
found.
R. v. Townsend
After arriving at the Edmonton 
International Airport on a  flight from 
Seattle, Townsend (a Canadian 
citizen) was referred for secondary 
s c r e e n i n g b e c a u s e t h e B S O 
considered his three bags, five-month travel pattern 
and lack of employment were unusual. His 
demeanour also changed and he stopped making 
eye contact during initial questioning. At the 
secondary inspection area, Townsend’s luggage was 
examined. He appeared agitated and was found in 
possession of 12 electronic devices. One of 
Townsend’s cell phones was searched and legal 
pornographic images were found. Townsend had a 
laptop computer but was reluctant to provide its 
password. When a BSO insisted on the  password 
for the laptop, Townsend provided it. The laptop 
was searched and images of child pornography 
were found. Townsend was then arrested, but he 
fainted and was taken to the hospital. The matter 
was also referred to a Child Exploitation Unit for 
further investigation. A subsequent forensic search 
of Townsend’s various devices revealed 4,422 
images and 53 videos of child pornography.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The judge found the  searches of the 
electronic devices were authorized 
under s. 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act, 
w h i c h h e h e l d w a s va l i d a n d 
constitutional. This provision permits the routine 
examination of any “goods”. The search of personal 
electronic devices, such as laptop computers and 
cell phones, fell within the definition of “goods”  for 
the purposes of s. 99(1)(a) and, as such, a search of 
these devices could be routinely  undertaken 
without any individualized grounds. The judge 
refused to revisit the three categories of border 
searches recognized by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in R. v. Simmons, [1998] 2 SCR 495: (1) 
routine questioning which every traveller 
undergoes at a port of entry, sometimes 
accompanied by a search of baggage and perhaps a 
pat or frisk of outer clothing; (2) a strip or skin 
search conducted in a private room after a 
secondary examination; and (3) a body cavity 
search. In his view, the searches of the electronic 
devices fell within the first category of routine 
searches and therefore did not engage s. 8 of the 
Charter.
In addition, the judge concluded that neither 
Canfield nor Townsend were detained during 
secondary screening, thus ss. 10(a) and 10(b) were 
not triggered. 
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Since the searches of the personal electronic 
devices fell within the routine category of border 
searches, there were no ss. 7, 8, 10(a) or 10(b) 
breaches of the Charter. The evidence of the 
photographs and videos retrieved from the personal 
electronic devices was admissible and the two men 
were  each convicted of possessing child 
pornography.
Alberta Court of Appeal
Both Canfield and Townsend 
submitted, among other things, 
that the trial judge erred by not 
reconsidering Simmons. They 
also argued that the judge erred by finding that s. 
99(1)(a) was not unconstitutional by permitting 
unlimited searches of electronic devices. In their 
view, ss. 7, 8 and 10 of the Charter  were violated. 
Furthermore, both accused contended that the 
evidence from the searches of their electronic 
devices ought to have been excluded under s. 
24(2).
Search of Electronic Devices
Canfield and Townsend 
suggested that s. 99(1)(a) 
was unconstitutional 
and breached s. 8 of the 
C h a r t e r b e c a u s e i t 
imposed no restrictions 
on the ability to search 
their personal electronic 
devices. In their opinion, 
p e o p l e h a v e a 
reasonable expectation 
of privacy with respect 
to their personal electronic devices even 
when crossing the border and the routine 
category of border search recognized in 
Simmons ought to have been revisited 
because  it did not distinguish between 
the search of such devices and the search 
of other goods. 
Section 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act 
provides:
An officer may (a) at any time up to the time of 
release, examine any goods that have been 
imported and open or cause to be opened any 
package or container of imported goods and take 
samples of imported goods in reasonable amounts.
The Court described this provision as follows:
[Section 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act] permits a 
customs officer to “examine any goods that 
have been imported and open or cause to be 
opened any package or container of imported 
goods”. The legislation provides no limits on 
the examination of any imported goods 
conducted under this section, beyond 
presumably that the search be conducted for a 
valid customs purpose. Computers and cell 
phones, including the electronic documents 
which they contain, have been treated in the 
jurisprudence as “goods” that can be searched 
at the border pursuant to s. 99(1)(a) as part of a 
routine search without raising any Charter 
implications, on the basis that they fall within 
the first category of routine search outlined in 
Simmons. [references omitted, para. 69]
The word “goods” is defined in s. 2(1) of the 
Customs Act and includes “conveyances, animals 
and any document in any form”. In the border 
context, “goods” has been interpreted to include 
documents in electronic form on personal 
electronic devices, such as cell phones and 
personal computers. The Court of Appeal agreed, 
stating that “the electronic documents, photos or 
videos on an electronic device fall within the 
broad definition of ‘goods’ in s. 2 of the Customs 
Act, which includes ‘any document in any form’.”
Charter of Rights
s. 8 Everyone has the right to be 
secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure. 
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Border Search Categories
In Simmons, the Supreme Court of Canada outlined 
three distinct types of border searches:
1. “[T]he routine of questioning which every 
traveller undergoes at a port of entry, 
accompanied in some cases by a search of 
baggage and perhaps a pat or frisk of outer 
clothing. No stigma is attached to being one of 
the thousands of travellers who are daily 
routinely checked in that manner upon entry to 
Canada and no constitutional issues are raised. 
It would be absurd to suggest that a person in 
such c i rcums tances i s de ta ined in a 
constitutional sense and therefore entitled to be 
advised of his or her right to counsel.”  This 
category - routine searches - do not engage 
constitutional issues. And “goods” may be 
searched under s. 99(1)(a). 
2. “[T]he strip or skin search, conducted in a 
private room, after a secondary examination and 
with the permission of a  customs officer in 
authority.”
3. “[T]he body cavity search, in which customs 
officers have recourse to medical doctors, to 
X-rays, to emetics, and to other highly invasive 
means.”
Considering these three discrete categories of 
border searches, the Court of Appeal found it 
necessary  to revisit them insofar as they applied to 
searches of personal electronic devices because 
“there have  been significant developments in the 
technology of personal electronic devices and the 
way they are used by Canadians since Simmons 
was decided in 1988”  and “the law with respect to 
searches of personal electronic devices in the 
domestic sett ing has, l ikewise, changed 
significantly in the same period.” 
Moreover, these categories of border search 
recognized by Simmons related primarily to 
physical or bodily integrity  and did not address 
informational privacy. “Computers and cell phones, 
including the electronic documents which they 
contain, have  been treated in the jurisprudence as 
‘goods’ that can be searched at the border 
pursuant to s. 99(1)(a) as part of a routine  search 
without raising any Charter implications, on the 
basis that they fall within the first category of 
routine search outlined in Simmons,” said the 
Court of Appeal. But, as the Court of Appeal 
concluded, s. 99(1)(a) did violate s. 8 of the Charter 
because  the provision did not impose limits on 
when and how searches of personal electronic 
devices could be conducted at the border. In its 
view, the contents of electronic devices should be 
treated differently at the border from other 
receptacles.
The Court of Appeal ruled that a search of an 
electronic device at the border required a  threshold 
requirement. Although it noted that “the threshold 
for the search of electronic devices may be 
something less than the reasonable grounds to 
suspect required for a strip search under the 
Customs Act,”  the Appeal Court “[declined] to set 
a threshold requirement for the search of 
electronic devices at this time.” 
“Whether the appropriate threshold is reasonable 
suspicion, or something less than that having 
regard to the unique nature of the border, will 
have to be decided by Parliament and fleshed out 
in other cases,” it continued. “However, to the 
extent that s. 99(1)(a) permits the unlimited search 
of personal electronic devices without any 
threshold requirement at all, it violates the 
protection against unreasonable search in s 8 of 
the Charter.” And, even if a threshold was to be 
“[I]n our view the threshold for the search of electronic devices may be something 
less than the reasonable grounds to suspect required for a strip search under the 
Customs Act. ... Whether the appropriate threshold is reasonable suspicion, or 
something less than that having regard to the unique nature of the border, will 
have to be decided by Parliament and fleshed out in other cases.”
Volume 20 Issue 6 ~ November/December 2020
PAGE 36
established it would not apply to all searches of 
personal electronic devices:
Although an unlimited and suspicion-less 
search of the contents of a personal electronic 
device would breach the Charter, we recognize 
that some of the information commonly stored 
on cell phones and other devices must be made 
available to border agents as part of the routine 
screening of passengers. For example, and 
without setting out an exhaustive list, we note 
that receipts and other information relating to 
the value of imported goods, as well as travel 
related documents, are an essential part of 
routine screening. The review of such items on 
a personal electronic device during a routine 
s c r e e n i n g w o u l d n o t c o n s t i t u t e a n 
unreasonable search under s 8. [para. 79]
Having found s. 99(1)(a) breached s. 8 to the extent 
that it authorized unlimited searches of the contents 
of personal electronic devices, it also ruled that the 
provision could not be saved as a reasonable limit 
under s. 1. Thus, the definition of “goods” in s. 2 
was of no force or effect insofar as the definition 
included the contents of personal electronic 
devices for the purposes of s. 99(1)(a). This 
declaration of invalidity, however, was suspended 
for one year given the serious problems posed by 
child pornography and other border protection 
goals. During this period of suspension, Parliament 
would have an opportunity to craft a solution to 
address and balance the various competing 
interests. 
In sum, the Court of Appeal ruled that the searches 
of the cell phones and personal computers in this 
case were unreasonable and infringed s. 8.
Right to Counsel 
Not every traveller who crosses the  border is 
detained for Charter purposes. For example, 
“routine questioning by customs officials at the 
border or routine luggage searches conducted on a 
random basis do not constitute detention for the 
purposes of s 10”   but a person forced to submit to 
a strip search is detained. In the case  of a search of 
a traveller’s personal electronic device, the traveller 
will not be detained every time. “Some searches of 
personal electronic devices may fall under the 
rubric of ‘routine questioning’ and not a more 
intrusive invasion of privacy,” said the Court of 
Appeal. “An obvious example would be receipts 
for imported goods and travel-related documents, 
stored in electronic format. A search for such 
items at the border would be considered routine. 
A wholesale search of a traveller’s correspondence 
or photos would not.” The Appeal Court 
continued:
In our view, the line from routine questioning 
to more intrusive search is crossed when the 
BSO develops “some sufficiently strong 
particularized suspicion”, sufficient to permit a 
broader search of the traveller’s electronic 
device, beyond what is required for routine 
screening. [para. 130]
In Canfield’s case, he was not detained when he 
“was subject to the normal screening process 
when he was referred to secondary screening, 
when his luggage was searched, and when he was 
asked whether he might have any child 
pornography on his phone.”  However, he was 
detained and should have been advised of his right 
to counsel when he “became the subject of a 
particularized suspicion and was subjected to a 
more intrusive search of his personal electronic 
device, in an interaction with significant legal 
consequences.”  At this point, the screening moved 
beyond routine  after Canfield answered “yes” to the 
question about his possession of child pornography 
and showed the BSO an image that constituted 
child pornography. The BSO had decided to 
conduct a more thorough search of the images on 
the phone. 
“Some searches of personal electronic devices may fall under the rubric of ‘routine 
questioning’ and not a more intrusive invasion of privacy. An obvious example 
would be receipts for imported goods and travel-related documents, stored in 
electronic format. A search for such items at the border would be considered 
routine. A wholesale search of a traveller’s correspondence or photos would not.”
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In Townsend’s case, his referral to secondary 
screening and the search of his luggage was a part 
of routine questioning. But when the BSO asked 
Townsend for the password to his laptop so a more 
thorough search could be conducted, he was 
detained and should have been advised of his s. 10 
rights. At this point, Townsend was the subject of 
“particularized suspicion”. 
s. 7 Charter
The principle against self-incrimination is a 
principle of fundamental justice  under s. 7 of the 
Charter. Since a traveller is compelled to answer 
questions truthfully under s. 11 of the Customs Act 
and failing to do so can result in a prosecution, 
Canfield and Townsend suggested any statements 
they made to the BSOs engaged the principle 
against self-incrimination enshrined in s. 7. 
Canfield suggested his right against self-
incrimination was violated when he responded to 
the question of whether he had child pornography 
on his cell phone and when he showed the BSO 
the suspected image on it. Townsend contended his 
right was breached when he  provided his password 
to unlock his computer. 
“If and when a traveller is detained ... his rights to 
counsel and to remain silent are engaged,”  said the 
Court of Appeal. “If he is compelled by statute to 
answer questions at that point, the admission of 
those compelled statements may well violate the 
principle against self-incrimination.”  The Appeal 
Court added:
It is well established that routine questioning at 
the border is not a sufficiently intrusive state 
action to amount to a detention, even when 
there is a statutory duty to answer those 
questions. Absent detention, there is no 
constitutional right to counsel and no 
constitutional right to remain silent at the 
border. ... We agree ... that routine questioning 
and routine searches at the border do not 
engage a traveller’s s. 7 rights. [references 
omitted, para. 146]
... [T]here can be a point where, what began as 
routine questioning and a routine search of 
belongings, becomes sufficiently intrusive that 
it qualifies as a detention that engages Charter 
rights. Absent detention, there is no right to 
counsel and no right to remain silent. Neither 
the existence of a statutory duty to answer the 
questions posed, nor the criminal penalties 
attendant on failing to do so honestly, gives rise 
to constitutional rights as long as the interaction 
remains part of routine questioning by Customs 
officials. The values animating the protection 
against self-incrimination are not implicated 
when a traveller is compelled to answer routine 
questions. The answers to such questions can, 
accordingly, be received in subsequent 
proceedings without violating the principle 
against self-incrimination. [references omitted, 
para. 149]
Canfield was subject to routine questioning and 
was not detained when he admitted he had child 
pornography on his electronic device in response 
to the question posed by the BSO. Since his 
admission that he had child pornography was made 
in the course of routine questioning prior to his 
detention, the use of this admission in his criminal 
trial did not offend s. 7. However, when he was 
asked to pull up an image of child pornography on 
his cell phone he  was detained. This was the start of 
a more intrusive inquiry, beyond routine 
questioning, and Canfield’s right to counsel and 
right to silence were engaged. Any statements he 
made after he was detained would be protected by 
the principle against self-incrimination and their 
admission in criminal proceedings would breach 
his rights under s 7.
Townsend was detained at the point when the BSO 
demanded his password so that she could conduct 
“If and when a traveller is detained, however, his rights to counsel and to remain 
silent are engaged. If he is compelled by statute to answer questions at that point, 
the admission of those compelled statements may well violate the principle 
against self-incrimination.” 
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a more thorough search of his laptop computer. At 
this point, Townsend’s s. 7 rights were triggered and 
any statements he made after this point would be 
subject to the right against self-incrimination.
s. 24(2) Charter
Despite a finding that the searches of the  electronic 
devices violated Canfield’s and Townsend’s rights 
under s. 8, and their ss. 7, 10(a), and 10(b) rights 
were infringed, the evidence was not excluded 
under s. 24(2). While  the impact on Canfield’s and 
Townsend’s Charter protected interests under ss. 7, 
8, and 10 were serious, the BSOs acted in good 
faith in searching the devices and the evidence 
uncovered was real and reliable evidence of a 
serious offence that was crucial to the Crown’s 
case.
The appeals were dismissed and the convictions 
were upheld. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
POLICE TURNED THEIR MINDS 
TO SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES: 
NO s.10(b) BREACH IN 
DELAYING ACCESS TO COUNSEL
R. v. Leonard, 2020 ONCA 802
Police suspected that the accused 
supplied cocaine to a street-level 
trafficker. The officers prepared a 
high-risk takedown of the accused 
because  a confidential informer said 
he possessed a  long firearm. At 10:35 pm, officers 
arrested him at gunpoint during a traffic stop. On a 
search incident to arrest, police found 56 grams of 
cocaine in his shorts and two mobile phones in his 
vehicle but no gun. When advised of his rights, the 
accused immediately  expressed a desire to speak 
with a lawyer.
The accused was transported to the police station. 
At about 10:55 pm, an officer left a  voicemail for 
the accused’s counsel of choice.  When it was 
learned this lawyer was unavailable, the accused 
asked to speak to a different lawyer of choice. At 
10:59 pm, the officer called this lawyer and left a 
voicemail. The accused then asked to speak to duty 
counsel. At 11:16 pm, a voicemail message was left 
for duty counsel requesting a call back. Meanwhile, 
police decided to apply for a search warrant to be 
executed at the accused’s residence. As a result, 
police would not permit the accused access to 
counsel for the time being. When duty  counsel 
called back at 11:38 pm, the lawyer was told he 
could not speak to the accused because of an 
outstanding warrant.
A search warrant application was prepared and 
faxed to a justice of the peace at 00:54 am. From 
01:59 am to 02:05 am, officers questioned the 
accused in the cellblock to determine whether the 
police would discover a firearm at the residence 
when they executed the search warrant and if 
anyone else was expected to be in the 
home.  Officers also asked about the presence of 
marijuana and other drug paraphernalia at the 
house. At 03:00 am a justice of the peace 
authorized a search warrant. At 03:10 am police 
called duty counsel again and left a voicemail. 
Duty counsel called back and the accused spoke 
with a lawyer at 03:21 am. The total delay in the 
accused speaking to counsel was about 3.5 hours.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The Crown conceded that the police 
breached the accused’s s. 10(b) rights by 
questioning him in the cellblock and 
chose not to adduce into evidence his 
statements or the results of the  search at his 
residence. But the judge ruled that the delay in not 
permitting the accused to speak to counsel was not 
a further s. 10(b) breach. In delaying access, the 
police responded to the specific circumstances of 
the case. 
The judge refused to exclude the cocaine found on 
the accused at the time of his arrest under s. 24(2). 
The s. 10(b) breach resulting from the questioning 
in the cellblock “fell within the mid-range of 
seriousness, had little or no impact on [the 
accused’s] Charter-protected interests, and that 
society’s interest in an adjudication on the merits 
favoured the admission of this reliable  and non-
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conscriptive evidence.” The accused was convicted 
of trafficking in a controlled substance and 
possessing a controlled substance for the purposes 
of trafficking. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused contended that the 
trial judge erred in finding the 
deliberate  delay of not facilitating 
his access to counsel was 
justified in the circumstances. He suggested that the 
trial judge failed to consider an officer’s testimony 
that it was “common practice”  for police to delay 
access to counsel when preparing search warrants 
for arrested persons’ homes. He also asserted the 
trial judge erred in finding that no s. 10(b) breach 
occurred in delaying his access because police  had 
turned their minds to the specific  circumstances at 
hand.
Deliberate Delay
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge correctly 
determined whether the deliberate delay of 
facilitating access to counsel was justified in the 
circumstances.
[T]he trial judge was alive to the concern that 
any delay in granting access to counsel must be 
reasonable. Indeed, he specifically referenced 
that the delay must be reasonable when he 
articulated the test to determine whether the 
deliberate delay of facilitating access to counsel 
was justified. He then conducted a detailed 
review of the circumstances of this case and 
found a demonstrated and justified basis for the 
police’s actions based on concerns for officer 
safety due to credible information about an 
outstanding firearm. Implicit in his reasoning 
was a finding that the police acted reasonably. 
[para. 12]
As for whether the trial judge erred in finding no s. 
10(b) breach occurred because police had turned 
their minds to the specific circumstances, the Court 
of Appeal stated:
[The officer] referred to a “common practice” of 
police delaying access to counsel when 
preparing search warrants for arrested persons’ 
homes. However, that statement has to be 
considered in the context of other evidence that 
demonstrated that the police had turned their 
minds to the specific concern about a long 
firearm being in [the accused’s] residence. That 
evidence included: the fact that the police 
engaged in a high-risk takedown because they 
were concerned about the firearm; the 
discussions that took place among the officers 
about delaying [the accused’s] contact with 
counsel because of concerns about the firearm; 
the interview in the cellblock included 
questions about the firearm; and [the officer’s] 
testimony that his primary motivation in 
delaying contact between [the accused] and 
counsel was public and police safety. [para. 13]
In this case, there was evidence that police turned 
their mind to the  specific circumstances of this case 
before deciding that the accused would be denied 
access to counsel for several hours while a search 
warrant was sought and obtained. 
The trial judge did not err in concluding that the 
delay in providing the accused access to duty 
counsel was not a s.10(b) violation. It was therefore 
unnecessary to undertake a new s. 24(2) analysis. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“[The officer] referred to a ‘common practice’ of police delaying access to counsel 
when preparing search warrants for arrested persons’ homes. However, that 
statement has to be considered in the context of other evidence that demonstrated 
that the police had turned their minds to the specific concern about a long firearm 
being in [the accused’s] residence.”
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SEARCH OF BAG INCIDENT TO 
ARREST JUSTIFIED FOR SAEFTY
R. v. Cain, 2020 NSCA 84
After responding to an alarm at a 
residence, police arrived and found 
the patio door had been smashed 
in.  Police cleared the premises and 
found no-one inside. The method of 
entry  and other circumstances reminded an officer 
of another break and enter on the  same street that 
occurred six or seven months prior. When dispatch 
was contacted, police were advised that the 
accused had been arrested and charged in the 
earlier break in and was bound by a recognizance 
to house arrest. The homeowner later found a 
considerable amount of jewelry was missing, along 
with a pillow case  which had been removed from a 
pillow on a bed.  A radio transmission was 
broadcast naming the accused as a  suspect in the 
recent break and enter, mentioned the location 
where  the break in occurred and reported that 
jewelry had been stolen, without providing 
specifics of the stolen items.
Officers attended at the accused’s residence and 
knocked on its door. When no-one answered, 
police set up surveillance at the back of the 
residence. A short time later the accused appeared. 
He was walking down a path and was clutching  a 
pillow case.  He was arrested for breaching his 
recognizance. He became argumentative, 
uncooperative and refused to let the pillow case go. 
Police obtained the pillow case from the accused 
and he was handcuffed and searched. In his 
pockets, police found a cell phone, lighter, several 
gold rings, a  bracelet and three cards, including 
one with the home-owners name on it. The pillow 
case was also searched and it was found to contain 
loose jewelry and jewelry boxes. The accused was 
then arrested for the break and enter. 
Nova Scotia Supreme Court
The officer who searched the accused 
said he did so as an incident to arrest but 
he was not asked for any further 
explanation. The officer who searched the 
pillow case also said he  did so as an incident to 
arrest. 
The accused suggested the search of his person as 
incident to arrest was not lawful because his arrest 
for breach of recognizance was invalid. In his view, 
the police failed to check and see if there was an 
exception to his recognizance which would have 
excused his absence from his home. Moreover, the 
accused suggested that even if his arrest was lawful, 
the mere assertion by the officer that he searched 
the accused “incident to arrest”, without further 
elaboration, was not sufficient to justify  the search. 
As for the search of the pillow case, he argued it 
had been removed from his grasp and he had been 
handcuffed. Thus, he was unable to compromise 
officer safety. 
The judge found the accused had been lawfully 
detained and searched. The accused had been 
detained when investigators’ formulated reasonable 
grounds to believe he was in breach of his 
recognizance. The police had the necessary 
subjective belief that the accused was arrestable for 
breaching his recognizance, and these grounds 
were objectively reasonable. Further, “while in 
some circumstances, an officer may choose to do 
so, it was not necessary that these  officers, who all 
knew that [the accused] had some exceptions to 
his house  arrest conditions, actually  review the 
Recognizance first, then investigate as to whether 
he had indeed been off of the premises for one of 
the reasons specified in the Recognizance, prior to 
arresting him.”  There was no s. 9 Charter breach. 
As for the searches, the judge noted that “the 
police  have the ability at common law to conduct 
a search of an accused incident to a lawful arrest 
and to seize  anything in his possession, if done for 
the purposes of ensuring the safety of the police 
and the accused, to prevent his escape, or to 
provide evidence against him. There is no need for 
the existence of reasonable and probable grounds 
to believe that the accused is in possession of 
weapons or evidence as a prerequisite to such a 
search, provided that the search is not done 
abusively or done with constraints that are 
disproportionate to the contextual circumstances.”  
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The search of the accused was consistent with the 
legitimate objective of a safety  search incident to 
arrest:
In this case, the stated reason for the search 
was “incident to arrest”.  This response is broad 
enough to encompass the three legitimate 
possible objectives of such a search.  At no time 
did the accused, through his counsel, ask either 
peace officer to “fine tune” the response, or 
explain whether it was one, two, or all three of 
these objectives which were in play.
In this case, the officer’s response was that the 
search was done “incident to arrest” – the 
response is consistent with three legitimate 
possible objectives to which such a search 
could aspire.   At no time did counsel elicit any 
information from the police officer which was 
inconsistent either objectively, or in the mind of 
the police officer, with one or more of these 
objectives. 
[...]
For example, one legitimate reason for the 
search would be protection of the police 
officers or the accused.   The officers were 
attempting to arrest the accused for breach of 
Recognizance.  He was also known to be a 
suspect in a break and enter that had only just 
occurred.  He also is known to be on a 
Recognizance as a result of one that occurred 
six to seven months earlier.  These include 
crimes of violence – it is certainly reasonable 
for the police to determine whether he has a 
weapon on his person.  [paras. 56-59, 2019 
NSSC 398]
The pillow case search was also reasonable:
What about the bag then? Recall, the accused 
argues that once he was handcuffed and the 
bag was being held by [the officer], no issue of 
police safety remained at that point.  Hence, 
there was no need to search it.
With respect, I disagree. He was arrested while 
clutching it. It was in plain view.  He would not 
let it go without a struggle and it interfered with 
police attempts to handcuff him.  
Having taken the bag, the police clearly cannot 
give it back to [the accused] after he is 
handcuffed - he is being arrested.   What are 
they to do with it?  They must maintain 
possession of it.  What if it contains a loaded 
weapon which could injure [the officer] or one 
of his colleagues if mishandled?  Clearly they 
had to know what was inside of it. [paras. 
60-62, 2019 NSSC 398]
The judge also found the searches were conducted 
in an appropriate manner. The warrantless searches 
were reasonable under the circumstances and did 
not breach s. 8 of the Charter. And, even if the 
accused’s Charter rights had been breached, the 
judge would have admitted the evidence under s. 
24(2). The accused was convicted of break and 
enter and possessing stolen property.
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
The accused submitted, among 
other things, that the trial judge 
erred in applying the law. He 
argued the trial judge erred in 
concluding  his arrest and detention were lawful, 
and the searches were not valid as an incident to 
arrest. But Justice Beaton, speaking  for the Court of 
Appeal, disagreed:
The burden was on the Crown to establish the 
warrantless search was reasonable and justified 
in the circumstances.  [The accused] was 
i n i t i a l l y a r r e s t e d f o r b r e a ch i n g h i s 
Recognizance, and the judge was satisfied the 
arrest and the search of [the accused] 
incidental to arrest were lawful.   The record 
reflects the judge’s correct application of the 
law regarding both the arrest and the search 
incidental to arrest. [para. 10]
The Court of Appeal also dismissed the accused’s 
motion to introduce fresh evidence in the form of a 
transcript of the police radio transmissions 
exchanged among the various police  officers 
involved in the events leading to his arrest. 
The trial judge committed no errors in reaching his 
conclusions and convicting the accused.  The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s Note: Additional details taken from R. v. 
Cain, 2019 NSSC 398.
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MANITOBANS MORE LIKELY TO 
FEEL CRIME HAS RISEN IN 
THEIR COMMUNITY
In a recent online study conducted in November 
2020 by the Research Co., residents of Manitoba 
were more likely to feel that crime has risen in their 
community than other residents of western Canada. 
British Columbia
People living on Vancouver Island were more likely 
to feel crime increased compared to those in other 
areas of the province.
Alberta
People living outside the Calgary or Edmonton 
Census Metropolitan Areas were more likely to feel 
crime increased.
Saskatchewan
People living in the Saskatoon CMA were more 
likely to feel crime increased compared to those in 
the Regina CMA or other areas of the province.
Manitoba
People living outside the Winnipeg CMA were 
more likely to feel crime increased compared to 
those living in it.
Public Safety in Western Canada
In the past three years Crime has ... increased Stayed the same Decreased Not sure
British Columbia 42% 46% 6% 7%
Alberta 48% 37% 6% 9%
Saskatchewan 41% 51% 5% 4%
Manitoba 54% 32% 7% 6%
BC - Feel crime has increased
Metro Vancouver 39%
Fraser Valley 49%
Vancouver Island 50%
Northern BC 44%
Southern BC 44%
BC - All 42%
Alberta - Feel crime has increased
Calgary CMA 41%
Edmonton CMA 43%
Rest of Alberta 57%
Alberta - All 48%
Saskatchewan - Feel crime has increased
Regina CMA 36%
Saskatoon CMA 47%
Rest of Saskatchewan 38%
Saskatchewan - All 41%
Manitoba - Feel crime has increased
Winnipeg CMA 51%
Rest of Manitoba 57%
Manitoba - All 54%
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“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly 
receiving the In Service: 10-8 
newsletter by email. You can sign up 
by clicking here. This will take you to 
the free Subscription Form that only 
requires an email. 
Also 
visit 
the 
online 
archive.
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